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NOTES

WILE E. COYOTE, ACME EXPLOSIVES AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF REGULATING VIOLENCE ON BROADCAST
TELEVISION
INTRODUCTION

In a pastel colored desert mesa somewhere in the southwest, a hungry and hapless coyote devises new and ingenious
ways to catch a small, bony road runner. Despite his best efforts, the coyote runs afoul of the contraptions he employs to
capture the bird and usually meets a violent end. This scene is
typical of the depiction of violence on broadcast television,
thought by many to have a negative and causal effect on children and society. For example, in Ohio, a mother of two
blamed a cable television cartoon program for prompting her
five-year-old son to set their trailer park home on fire, thereby
leading to the death of his two-year-old sister.' In different
parts of the country, several high school students were killed
or seriously injured while imitating a stunt they viewed in a
film: they laid on the median of roads as cars drove by on either side of them.2 Incidents such as these have caused proposals to control and restrict violence on television to gain
ground both in government and among the public.
Since the invention of broadcast radio and television, Congress, the courts and the public, grappling with the perceived
negative effects of broadcast media, have tried to control and

See The Week in Review (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 24, 1993).
See Caryn James, If Simon Says "Lie Down in the Road," Should You?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at D2; David Van Biema, Lie Down in Darkness, TIME, Nov.
1, 1993, at 49.
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shape that medium's messages through regulation.3 These
regulations have involved a range of issues including debate
over broadcast signal strength, ownership rules and operating
procedures,4 as well as control of the content of the broadcasted material.5 Government restrictions have included prohibitions on everything from political editorials and endorsements
by licensees to obscenity and indecent speech.6
Despite these restrictions, pressure has increased for
greater control and regulation over the type and quantity of

' For purposes of this Note, the term "broadcasting" refers to the transmission
of messages, information and entertainment via electromagnetic waves. Consequently, this Note will not discuss, except where necessary, the regulation of cable
television ("cable") and direct broadcast satellite transmission. The federal government exercises control of both radio and television broadcasting. Originally, control
rested with the Secretary of Commerce, as set forth in the Radio Communications
Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), then with the Federal Radio
Commission pursuant to the Radio Communications Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934), and finally with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") pursuant to the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988)).
Radio and television broadcasts utilize different parts of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The "spectrum" refers to the range of frequencies from zero cycles per
second through billions of cycles per second. AM and FM radio and broadcast
television each occupy a separate slice of the spectrum. See generally Arthur S. De
Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969) (proposing that the broadcast spectrum be parceled out in a system more closely related
to that of property rights); Edmund L. Andrews, The Ground Rules for Wireless,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at D5 (discussing the FCC's announcement of rules
regulating the auction of slices of the broadcast spectrum for use by wireless communications operators).
" Several sources detail the federal governmenfs role in regulating television
and radio. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach
to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207 (1982). Messrs. Fowler and Brenner
were, respectively, the Chairman of the FCC and the Legal Assistant to the Chairman during the 1980s. Their article helped set the groundwork for the deregulation of the communications industry in the 1980s. See also generally ERIK
BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the growth and social effects
of broadcasting since its invention in the 19th century).
' See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 4, at 217; Donald E. Lively,
Modern Media and the First Amendment: Rediscovering Freedom of the Press, 67
WASH. L. REV. 599 (1992) (arguing that broadcasting should be granted full first
amendment protection); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing
Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989) (arguing that the current regulatory
philosophy should be changed to one that more closely resembles that of property
rights).
8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (barring obscene broadcasts); Spitzer, supra
note 5, at 997-1006.
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televised violence.' Although traditionally a target of interest
groups, violence on television has become a favorite target of a
much wider range of people.8 The call for reducing television
violence has begun to focus on ways government can mandate
restrictions on the amount, type and timing of violent programming on American broadcast stations and networks.9

' Violence on television recently has received a great deal of attention. In the
103d Congress, several bills were introduced to legislate control of the level and
type of violence on television. One of these bills called for the FCC merely to review and report on the violence contained in television programs. H.R. 2159, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Another called for the FCC to establish standards to reduce the amount of programming that contains violence. Television and Radio
Program Violence Reduction Act of 1993, H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
A third would have instructed the FCC to institute a ban on violent programming
during hours when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion
of the audience. Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act of 1993, S.
1383, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993). The most interesting piece of legislation mandated the inclusion of a computer chip inside all new television sets that, in conjunction with a signal sent by the broadcaster, would allow parents to lock-out
certain programs that have been rated violent. H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
With the election of a new Congress in November, 1994, two bills have been
introduced: Television Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act of
1995, S. 306, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposal to require inclusion of circuitry in all television sets that will enable viewers to block the reception of violent
programming) and The Children's Media Protection Act of 1995, S. 332, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposal to establish television violence rating code and
eliminate violent programming during certain hours of the day).
' Critics of television violence protest its perceived negative effect on the behavior of children and society generally. See, e.g., Paul Simon, Remarks Before the
National Press Club, Sept. 16, 1993 (noting that television violence is "one of the
causes of crime and other anti-social behavior"), available in LEXIS, News Library,
FEDNEW File; Janet Reno, Remarks Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, Oct. 20, 1993 ("in high crime areas, television violence
and real violence have become so intertwined that they may well feed on each
other.... [V]iolence has become the salt and pepper of our television diet. Fictional shows and movies feature dozens of killings of bad guys or innocents."),
available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File.
Two FCC commissioners recently expressed concern over the amount of violence on television. James Quello identified "the ever-growing public outcry against
excessive graphic sex and violence on T.V. and cable, particularly the growing
public outcry against glamorized violence and brutality" as evidence of the need to
regulate televised violence. James H. Quello, Remarks at the Wertheim
Schroder/Variety Seminar, Mar. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, FCC
File. Commissioner Ervin Duggan commented that he is encouraged that "citizens
and officials of the broad center . . . have launched [the television violence] debate." Ervin S. Duggan, Remarks Before the ICA Panel on the Public Interest,
May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, FCC File.
' See supra note 7. Senator Ernest Hollings argues that Congress must ban
"the broadcast of violent programming during hours when children make up a
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Government regulation of violence on television raises
novel and complex constitutional issues that neither courts nor
scholars have addressed adequately.' ° Regulating violence on
television presents a deceptively simple and popular way to
address the extremely high societal levels of violence and the
perceived moral degradation of American society. Such regulation, however, implicates first amendment concerns that limit
government's ability to restrict televised violence.
Those who advocate restricting violence on television have
maintained that violence, like indecency or obscenity, may be
restricted by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "Commission"). In effect, these advocates argue that restrictions on television violence carry similar legislative justifications and social goals as do the prohibitions on indecency and
obscenity." The Supreme Court, however, has neither articu-

substantial share of the audience." Ernest F. Hollings, TV Violence: Survival vs.
Censorship: Save the Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at A21.
0 Up until 1992, few articles addressed the constitutionality and policy implications of regulating violence on television. See James A. Albert, Constitutional
Regulation of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1978) (arguing that the
First Amendment should not bar application of regulatory measures restricting
violence on television); Emily Campbell, Television Violence: Social Science vs. the
Law, 10 LoY. ENT. L.J. 413 (1990) (reviewing social science data and concluding
that such data cannot be used to support government regulation of violence on
television); Thomas G. Kratteomaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978) (concluding that social science data that suggest a correlation between violence on
television and societal violence do not satisfy constitutional scrutiny and should
not be used to justify restrictions on television violence). Recently, however, there
has been increasing interest in the subject. See, e.g., Stephen J. Kim, 'Viewer Discretion is Advised": A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television Violence, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1994) (arguing that reductions in televised violence can be
effectuated through the removal of structural constraints on the television industry
rather than through content-based restrictions on programming); Kevin W.
Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 107 (1994) (arguing that certain violent expression can
be treated the same as sexual obscenity and should therefore be unprotected by
the First Amendment); Julia W. Schlegel, The Television Violence Act of 1990: A
New Program for Government Censorship?, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 187 (1993) (concluding that the Television Violence Act of 1990 is constitutionally sound, but
unlikely to reduce violence on television).
" See Reno, supra note 8, where the Attorney General concluded that several
Senate bills introduced in the 103d Congress to control violence on television were
constitutional. In support of this conclusion, Reno cited the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978), which upheld restrictions on the
broadcast of sexually indecent speech. See also Television Violence: Hearing of the
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
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lated a precise definition for violence nor addressed whether
depictions of violence could constitute a category of speech
subject to state restriction, similar to indecent, offensive or obscene speech. The unusual and ill-defined status of broadcasting within first amendment doctrine further complicates the
issue of restricting violence on television.
This Note examines the constitutionality of regulations
which seek to curtail depictions of violence on television. The
examination focuses on the assertion by regulation advocates
that "violence" comprises a category of speech susceptible to
regulation similar to those regulations surrounding sexually
explicit materials. The fundamental differences between the
violent and sexual aspects of human behavior, however, render
government-imposed restrictions on television violence unconstitutional. The definitional uncertainties surrounding the
term "violence" make regulations restricting violence on television unconstitutional and unwise. For example, socially
deconstructive depictions of violence and those that carry socially positive messages often are blurred together. Moreover,
when combined with the presence of violence in virtually all
forms of programming and both the positive and negative messages that violence can carry, these definitional uncertainties
invalidate the constitutionality of restrictions on television
violence.
Part I surveys the history of regulation of broadcast media
with a brief discussion of the difficulty in defining "violence."
This section also sets forth the reasons for limiting this discussion to broadcast television. The historical overview serves as a
foundation for Part II's more detailed examination of the case
law that has delineated constitutionally protected speech outside of the broadcast medium. Finally, Part III demonstrates
that any attempt to apply the analysis used for indecent, offen(1993) ("I'm not a lawyer, but I don't believe that the framers of the Constitution
ever envisioned that their document, written for freedom, written in the blood of
the revolution, ever intended protection for pornographers or the purveyors of a
steady stream of violence.") (statement of Senator Exon (D.-Neb.), Oct. 20, 1993),
available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File; Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975) (discussing constitutionality of restrictions on violence and sex on broadcast television); Saunders,
supra note 10, at 107 (arguing that the same factors which 'justifly] the channeling of indecent non-obscene sexual and excretory references . . . could justify the
channeling of indecent violent material").
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sive or obscene material to television violence must fail because of definitional, legal, doctrinal, and policy infirmities.
I. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONAL AND SCOPE ISSUES
The debate surrounding the regulation of televised violence has not adequately addressed the scope government
controls may have and the definitions that will be employed to
effectuate any restrictions. Although the terms "violence" and
"television" are constantly used, neither word has been adequately defined. Before debate begins over the form such regulations should take, it is essential to set forth both a
definitional framework for "violence" and to delineate the type
of media to which such regulations will apply.
Despite having allocated a great deal of attention to the
subject, Congress has yet to offer any concrete definition of
violence beyond that found in the dictionary. 2 Webster's Dictionary defines violence as "an exertion of any physical force so
as to injure or abuse (as in warfare or in effecting an entrance
into a house)".'" Bills pending in Congress that seek to regulate or prohibit violence on television, define violence as broadly and vaguely as does Webster's. 4 These bills provide little or
no guidance to the FCC or the courts as to specific situations

12 Canadian broadcasters recently have adopted a voluntary code that bans
programs with "gratuitous violence" and limits those shows that include violent
scenes to hours after 9:00 P.M. Elizabeth Kolbert, Canadians Curbing TV Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at C15. The code, however, does not define either "gratuitous" or "violent scenes." Id. It also does not cover cable television. More importantly, the Canadian Constitution does not grant as much emphasis on the value
of free speech. Instead, free speech must be balanced against other social concerns.
13

WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2554 (unabridged) (1981).

One bill defined violence as:
any action that has as an element the use or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or against one's self, with intent to
cause bodily harm to such person or one's self. For purposes of this Act,
an action may involve violence regardless of whether or not such action
or threat of action occurs in a realistic or serious context or in a humorous or cartoon type context.
H.R. 2837, supra note 7, at § 3 (proposal to require the FCC to establish standards to reduce the amount of programming that contains violence from broadcast
television and radio); see also S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993) (proposing
that broadcasters and cable operators be required to insert warning labels and
voice-overs on violent programming). Of the two bills thus far introduced at the
104th Congress, neither contains a definition of violence. See supra note 7.
1
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or contexts in which "violent" acts rise to a level that warrants
regulatory intervention. Moreover, when Congress's proposed
definition of violence is compared to the judicial and regulatory
definitions used in indecency and obscenity cases, the danger
of limiting the number and types of violent acts on television
becomes apparent. 5
Over the past several decades, there have been a number
of attempts to define violence and to catalogue its prevalence
on television. One of the more prominent and controversial
researchers in this area is George Gerbner, a psychology professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Gerbner
has been active in the campaign against violence on television
and has compiled statistics on the number of violent acts
shown in various television programs. Gerbner employs an
expansive definition of violence that includes any act that is a
"clear-cut, unambiguous, and overt episode of physical violence-hurting or killing or the threat of hurting and/or killing
in any context." 6 Gerbner's definition, however, fails to account for either the substantive aspects of the violent
acts-such as whether the acts are humorous slapstick or
chain-saw massacres-or the dramatic context of violence-such as when the acts appear in documentaries, news
stories and works designed to demonstrate the negative social
consequences of violence.' 7
The inadequacy of Gerbner's and other current definitions
of violence is further- demonstrated by the fact that in 1993
both the television networks and cable broadcasters commissioned studies to define, analyze and report on televised violence. For example, Jeff Cole, the Director of UCLA's Center
for Communication Policy is currently working on defining violence for the network-sponsored study his group is conducting. 8 Cole notes that "[miost studies simply count violent

, See infra notes 250-320 and accompanying text.
Kim, supra note 10, at 1441 n.19.
,Gerbner has been severely criticized for his definitional

framework and

methodological techniques. See Krattenmaker & Powe, Jr., supra note 10, at 1170
(arguing that the social science data that suggest a correlation between violence on

television and societal violence should not be used to justify restrictions on television violence).
"' Daniel Cerone, A New Effort Under Way to Define Violence on T.V., LA.
TMES, Sept. 3, 1994, at Fl.
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and all acts are lumped together with nothing to dis-

tinguish either the context in which the violence occurs or
whether the violence is appropriate or justified. Under that
system, a pinch is fairly equated with a decapitation." 9 As an
illustration of how absurd current definitions of violence are,
Cole recounts that according to one study, "the most violent
show on television last year was a 'Laugh-In' retrospective.""
The widespread failure to define violence hampers attempts to analyze and assess the impact and constitutionality
of restrictions on violent television programming. The definition one chooses will impact the nature of the analysis and the
resulting legal conclusions. A broad definition of violence will
encompass a wide variety of activity and therefore, will raise
more constitutional questions than a narrow definition. Moreover, the historical concern that definitionally infirm restrictions on speech will chill freedom of expression, is particularly
relevant to restrictions on violent speech. Without a specific
and well-recognized definition, individuals-such as writers,
producers and network executives-will not be able to conform
their behavior to comply with regulations restricting violence.
Instead, these individuals may choose not to write, produce or
broadcast meritorious programs that contain violence simply
out of fear and uncertainty that such programs would trigger
regulatory sanctions.
The number of proposed definitions of violence make restrictions upon it difficult to analyze. Consequently, in lieu of a
recognizable and commonly accepted definition of violence,
commentators must rely primarily on the definitions laid forth
in various legislative proposals. Although these definitions are
uniformly broad and raise immediate vagueness and overbreadth concerns, they provide useful starting points for an
analysis of restrictions on television violence. Of course, as the
analysis of violence restrictions becomes more complex and
intricate, it will be necessary to formulate narrower definitions. It will become clear, however, that even relatively narrow definitions lead to the same conclusion: restrictions on
television violence are unconstitutional.
The current debate surrounding violence on television has
19 Id.
20

Id.
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also failed to distinguish between the various types of media
that would be restricted. Television is a far more complex medium than it was just a few years ago. In addition to the traditional broadcast networks of ABC, CBS and NBC, the FOX
network has made significant inroads in viewership. 2 There
also has been significant growth in the number of independent
stations.22 These independent stations broadcast both network
and syndicated programming. 3 All of these broadcast outlets,
both network and independent stations, carry a variety of
programming, some produced by the networks, some by independent production companies, and some by Hollywood studios.' Hollywood produces a combination of material both for
immediate distribution on television as well as for theater distribution followed by television broadcast at a later date.
Even more significant than the growth and independence
of traditional broadcasting outlets has been the explosion of
cable television subscriptions.26 In addition to the various networks and independent television stations carried on thousands of various cable systems nationwide, dozens of cable-only
stations exist, such as the Turner Broadcast System, Cable
News Network, Discovery Channel, and American Movie Classics. Several premium channels, such as Home Box Office and
Cinemax, as well as pay-per-view 'channels, complete the spectrum of recently developed broadcasting outlets.
2 FOX, launched in 1987 and considered an "emerging network" by the FCC,

now has over 150 full-time broadcast affiliates. In re Review of the Prime Time
Access Rule, 9 F.C.C.R. 6328, 6338 (Oct. 25, 1994) (noting "it is clear that the
three major TV networks face more competition in today's marketplace than they
did in 1970 or even in 1980"). Two other networks recently have entered the fray.
UPN, backed by Viacom, and the Warner Brothers network ("WB") each began

broadcasting in January 1995.

UPN began with 96 affiliates, while WB had 60

affiliates. Walt Belcher, New Networks Join the Fray, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 11, 1995,
at 1.
' Since 1970, the total number of commercial and non-commercial television
stations has increased by 76% from 862 stations to 1520 stations. Of these 1520
stations, more than 450 are independent stations, up from 67 in 1970. In re Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 9 F.C.C.R. 6328, 6337.
' Id. at 6331. Independent stations air some locally produced programming,
but buy most of their programs from syndicators, program producers, and previously aired network programs ("re-runs").
24

Id. at 6332.

2 Id.
21 In 1975, only 13.2% of television households subscribed to cable television,
but by 1994 the number had increased to 62.5%. Id. at 6338.
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With this increase in outlets for television programming,
not surprisingly, the debate surrounding televised violence has
become more complicated and confused. Indeed, it is common
for legislators, policymakers and the public to speak of regulating violence on television without identifying whether the
programs subject to regulation will be aired on broadcast television or cable television." These discussions, therefore, fail
to recognize the different levels of constitutional protections
applicable to these different mediums. Any discussion concerning violence on television must carefully distinguish between
different media.
With this complex and diverse situation in mind, this Note
will focus solely on broadcast television-i.e., television that
appears via transmission of signals through the electromagnetic spectrum. Unlike cable television, broadcast television first
amendment law has been fairly well developed. Although some
of the rules governing violence on broadcast television were
created to regulate radio transmissions, most of them are
readily adaptable to the television medium and are relevant to
the analysis of regulations that purport to restrict televised
violence. In addition, even though the virtual monopoly broadcast television once had has ended, the networks and independent stations are still enormously influential and provide a
majority of the populace with televised images."

27 See Nightline: The Problem of Violence in TV and Movies (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 20, 1993) (discussing the cable television show Beavis and
Butthead, the film The Program, and the broadcast television show NYPD Blue as
examples of violent shows that negatively effect behavior). Dick Wolf, producer of
the television programs Miami Vice and Law and Order, summed up the problem:
"Congress does not differentiate between television and the networks, and when

indepennetworks ...
you talk about television you're really talking about ...
dents ... cable . . . [and] premium channels, and they all serve different masters

and they're all being lumped together." Id.
28 A.C. Nielsen reports that 98% of United States households have televisions,
38% have two or more sets, 28% three or more sets, and 62% subscribe to cable.
CoMm. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1993, at 7. The prime-time viewing share of the three broadcast networks for October, 1994, was 58%, down from 63% for the same period
one year earlier. COMM. DAILY, Oct. 13, 1994, at 10.

19941

REGULATING VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION

II. BROADCASTING: A CONSTITUTIONAL TWILIGHT ZONE
A. What's the Frequency? Basic First Amendment Principles
and the Context of Broadcasting
The First Amendment is clear that "Congress shall make
no law abridging... the freedom of speech."2 9 This stricture,
however, has been narrowed in a variety of ways by both Congress and the Supreme Court. This narrowing has taken on a
variety of forms, ranging from upholding restrictions based on
certain categories of speech-such as obscenity and indecency-to allowing regulations aimed at limiting the non-communicative effects of speech-such as noise and disruption. In
addition, the means by which speech is transmitted has been
determinative of the constitutionality of regulations.
The constitutionality of restrictions on speech is best analyzed by examining whether the restriction is "content-based"
or "content-neutral." Content-based restrictions are those restrictions that seek to proscribe or regulate words because of
their perceived impact on the listener or on society as a
whole." Content-based restrictions are subject to the highest
level of judicial scrutiny, and normally are held unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates that the restriction is a
"narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling state end."3 '
Although this burden is difficult for the government to sustain,
certain content-based restrictions designed to restrict particular categories of speech may be constitutional under a reduced
form of judicial scrutiny." These categories generally include
fighting words, libel, defamation, 3incitement
to riot, slander,
3
obscenity, profanity and indecency.

2-

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

" See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 56 U. CH!. L. REV. 46,
47 (1987).
3' R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992) (striking down a
municipal ban on hate speech); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)
(striking down a state university ban on religious worship).
32 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."); R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (obscenity and defamation are forms of expression "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
" Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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When the government restricts speech because of its noncommunicative impact it is considered a content-neutral restriction. 4 Such regulations are subject to a lower standard of
review than content-based restrictions. The government need
only show that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that alternative channels exist to communicate information.3 5 Content-neutral restrictions are often characterized as "time, place, or manner"
restrictions.3 6 For example, regulations affecting the use of
sound trucks and amplification equipment have been upheld as
valid time, place or manner regulations.
In addition to the content-based versus content-neutral
inquiry, the medium used to transmit speech also may subject
speech to regulation. 8 Broadcasting is the quintessential example of a medium that has been subjected to relatively high
degrees of governmental control. "[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection."39 Even with this seemingly settled
constitutional framework for broadcasting, new modes of communication and new social and political concerns challenge the
precise shape of this framework and make the future scope of
broadcasting's first amendment freedoms unpredictable.4"
Televised violence is an example of an issue that does not fit
neatly into the current legal framework surrounding broadcasting.

"' See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)
(upholding National Park Service ban on sleeping in public parks); Stone, supra
note 30, at 48.
35 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
36 Id.
" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding New
York City requirement that all concerts in public parks use city-owned and operated sound equipment); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding restriction on the use of sound trucks).
38 "We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special
first amendment problems." FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding
FCC restriction on indecent broadcasts) (citing Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502-03 (1952)).
" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
40 Until 1994, cable television's placement in the first amendment hierarchy
was unclear. In Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), the
Court refused to extend the less rigorous first amendment standard reserved for
broadcasting and instead held that regulations affecting cable television must satisfy strict scrutiny.
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Although concern over violence on television is not new,4 '
the jurisprudence concerning restrictions on the dissemination
of violent speech and imagery remain underdeveloped." Consequently, judicial assessment of the constitutionality of restrictions on broadcast television violence must weave the legal
principles derived from past efforts to impose general regulations on broadcasting as an industry with those principles
surrounding restrictions on the content of speech that is transmitted through broadcasting medium. The history, current
status and efficacy of these restrictions provide a window onto
the contours of the First Amendment as it applies to restrictions on the amount of violence on broadcast television.
B. Birth of a Medium: The Early Regulatory Framework
As early as 1912, broadcasting presented the courts and
Congress with a regulatory dilemma.4" Initial concerns revolved around the creation of a radio system that was relatively free from interference and provided the quality necessary to attract listeners and provide for growth." As the radio

41

Congressional investigations regarding the behavioral effects on television

have a long history. The Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency conducted
investigations in 1954, 1955, 1961-62 and 1964. In 1971, the Senate Communications Subcommittee held hearings on the issue of sex and violence on television.
Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d
418 (1975). Moreover, the FCC reported that it had received 2000 complaints in
1972 regarding violent and sexually oriented programming. By 1974, that number
had increased to 25,000. Id.
42 Cases that have addressed dissemination of violence are few. See Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948) (striking down New York statute which
forbade the sale or distribution to minors of violent material which was considered
likely to stimulate juvenile delinquency); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster,
773 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-83 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (finding unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague a Missouri statute that restricted the dissemination to minors of video
cassettes depicting violence), aff'd, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992); Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 533 (Tenn. 1993) (finding constitutional
a statute that barred the display for sale or rental materials harmful to minors,
but the term "excess violence" void for vagueness). For a discussion of Winters, see
infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
' See Radio Communications Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302 (setting forth the initial
governmental regulation of radio). See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 227 (1943) (holding that the FCC had the authority to regulate chain broadcasting pursuant to the public interest standard); BARNOUW, supra note 4, at 1724.
44 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 n.5 (1969). Con-
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industry matured, however, the imperative to regulate the
mechanics of broadcasting expanded to include the perceived
need to promulgate content-based restrictions.4 5 This new regulatory interest concerns regarding the constitutional propriety
of regulating content in broadcast media.4"
The Federal Radio Act of 1927 marked the first modern
regulation of the broadcast spectrum.' This Act served as the
basis for the establishment of the Federal Radio Commission
("FRC") and began modern regulation of the electromagnetic

gress first attempted to formulate a regulatory system through the Radio Communications Act of 1912, which forbade the operation of a radio station without a license, allocated certain frequencies for the use of the government, and imposed restrictions upon distress signals and similar messages. See Radio Communications
Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377 (upholding constitutionality of requiring broadcasters to air both sides of controversial issues); Fowler
& Brenner, supra note 4, at 213; Spitzer, supra note 5, at 1043.
The 1912 Act worked well, until the number of broadcast stations multiplied
following World War I. By 1923, there were several hundred stations nationwide
with more stations competing for the limited number of wavelengths each year.
NBC, 319 U.S. at 227 (upholding regulations concerning chain broadcasting). In an
effort to provide some order to this rapid growth, the Secretary of Commerce,
Herbert Hoover, selected two frequencies and licensed all stations to operate on
one or the other frequency. Id. at 211. Eventually, however, the field became too
crowded, forcing Hoover to assign frequencies and hours of operation to each station. Id. By 1925, there were 600 stations nationwide with 175 applications for
new stations pending. Id.
Hoover's system survived until 1926, when the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois issued its decision in United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). In Zenith, the court held that the 1912 Act did not give
the Secretary of Commerce the power to set conditions on licensees regarding
wavelength or hours of operation. Id. at 616; see also BARNOUW, supra note 4, at
57; Spitzer, supra note 5, at 1044. After the Attorney General, at Hoover's request, investigated the matter and decided that the result in Zenith was correct,
Hoover conceded defeat and did not appeal the decision. Id. Chaos reigned in the
immediate aftermath of the Zenith decision as stations indiscriminately increased
their power, arbitrarily set broadcast wavelengths and extended their hours of
operation. 319 U.S. at 212. Within seven months of the Zenith decision, almost
200 new stations flooded the airwaves. Id. Pressure from the public as well as the
radio industry quickly mounted on Congress for a regulatory solution to the confusion that had engulfed the airwaves. Id.
'5 See infra notes 50-141 and accompanying text.
46 See Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932) (affirming the Federal Radio Commission's authority to review past
content of broadcasts when determining suitability for license renewal), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929) (Federal Radio Commission has authority to alter
broadcast times and frequencies based on nature of broadcasts), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
" Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
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spectrum.4 8 Congress gave the FRC authority over wavelength
settings, hours of operation, and power levels.4 9 Although the
Act specifically forbade the FRC from engaging in censorship,
it nonetheless gave the FRC the power to regulate "in the
public interest, convenience and necessity."5" This broad congressional grant of power to the FRC proved crucial to the
FRC's functioning and its self-perceived mission. Because Congress had delegated to the FRC the power to determine virtually all aspects of broadcasting, the FRC became the sole arbiter of what constituted the "public interest." Indeed, the public
interest standard became the hook upon which the FRC, its
successor, the FCC, and the courts justified the government's
ability to regulate the content of broadcasts.5 1 It was not until
the court cases spawned by the 1927 Act, and later the 1934
Act, that "public interest" was given at least a limited judicial
definition.52
In 1931, KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio
Commission"s was the first significant case to address the
meaning of regulating in the "public interest." In KFKB, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court held that the FRC's refusal
to renew KFKB's license based on the content of that station's
past programming did not constitute censorship in violation of
Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927.' In making its decision,
" See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1943); Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 4, at 214.
49 44 Stat. at 1163.
50 Id. at 1170.
" See infra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850
(D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v.
Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Great Lakes Broadcasting v.
Federal Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
The resulting framework from these cases laid the legal foundation for the current
governmental regulation of the broadcast spectrum.
5 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
"' KFKB was a powerful 5000 watt station that enjoyed both wide geographical
coverage throughout the midwest and a high number of dedicated listeners. The
licensee of KFKB was Dr. John Brinkley, who operated his own clinic and pharmacy, and dispensed medical advice to listeners who wrote in about various ailments they were suffering. Conveniently, the cure for the listener's ailments included prescriptions that were available only at Dr. Brinkley's clinic or through
the mail order business he had established. Dr. Brinkley also achieved notoriety
because of his unusual procedures to improve the male sex drive. His prescribed
therapy included the implantation of a young Goat's gonads into the scrotum of
his male patients. By 1928, Dr. Brinkley had a gross annual income $150,000. See
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the court granted great deference to the FRC's administrative
ruling. The court reasoned that, because of the limited availability of broadcasting frequencies, the FRC was entitled to
consider the "character and quality of the service being rendered."55 The court found that by giving the FRC the power to
regulate in the public interest, Congress intended that stations
"should not be a mere adjunct of a particular business but
should be of a public character."56 The exercise of the public
interest standard, the court concluded, required the FRC to
examine a station's past conduct. Such a review, they found,
"is not censorship."57
The following year the FRC gained another victory and
further judicial support for its regulatory review powers in
Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commission." In
Trinity Methodist, the FRC again relied on the public interest
standard of the 1927 Act to deny a license renewal to radio
station KGEF on the basis of the content of its programming.59 The court found that KGEF's broadcasts were not in

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMEmcAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 23-30
(1987).
65 KFKB, 47 F.2d at 672.
56 Id.
"7 Id. Knowingly or not, the court in KFKB enunciated the "scarcity doctrine,"
which would publicly justify virtually all future governmental intrusions into
broadcasting content. The scarcity doctrine holds that because the number of frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum is finite, only a limited number of stations can broadcast at any particular time. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). Therefore, the government must license stations in such a
way as to maximize the public benefit achievable through broadcasting. FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 805 (1978). This maxmization can be achieved, it is argued, only through a governmental body vested
with the power to license, re-license and revoke licenses. Id. ("the physical scarcity
of broadcast frequencies [allows the FCC] to allocate broadcast frequencies in the
'public interest'"). As part of this decisionmaking process, the regulatory body must
be able to consider the content of the broadcasts so that it may compare the
"quality" of these broadcasts with competing stations or with others vying for a license to broadcast on the same frequency.
It is difficult to argue that governmental regulation or oversight is unnecessary to establish and maintain a coherent radio and television broadcasting system. The confusion that followed the Zenith decision indicated that a governmental
system of oversight and licensure was needed. Id. at 617. The key question, however, is the discretion the government should have when granting or revoking
licenses when technical considerations are constant but when the content of broadcasts is controversial or anti-majoritarian.
58 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
"' Id. at 851. KGEF was owned by Reverend Doctor Shuler, whose radio pro-
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the public interest because they "obstruct[ed] the administration of justice, offend[ed] the religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire[d] political distrust and civic discord, ... [and]
offend[ed] youth and innocence by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality."0
Unlike the ruling in KFKB, where there was a legitimate
issue as to whether the licensee's program was detrimental to
the public health, the standard set forth in Trinity Methodist
for license renewal became more vague and intangible. Based
on Trinity Methodist, the FRC could deny licenses because of a
licensee's failure to conform with accepted, popular standards
of speech and morality. The Trinity Methodist court noted that
broadcasting, "this great science," should serve a higher purpose than to simply entertain or become "a theater for the
display of individual passions and the collision of personal
interests."6 ' Trinity Methodist expanded the FRC's discretion
to determine the scope of the "public interest." After KFKB and
Trinity Methodist, the definition of public interest included
both the protection of the public's health as well as the protection of its sexual, religious and political character.
Congress implicitly ratified the holdings of KFKB and
Trinity Methodist when it retained the public interest standard
in the Federal Communications Act of 1934.62 This legislation
transferred power from the FRC to the newly created FCC. 3
Over the next sixty years, the FCC developed guidelines, restrictions, mandates and prohibitions which broadcasters were
required to follow in order to retain their license and avoid
fines and sanctions.' As the need to exert power over the
now-mature radio industry increased, the FCC faced new regugrams included attacks on Jews, Catholics and local political leaders. Id. at 850,
852; see also POWE, supra note 54, at 13-23.
60 Trinity Methodist, 62 F.2d at 852-53.
6' Id. at 853.
62 47 U.S.C. § 309(2) (1988) ("the Commission shall determine . . . whether the
public interest . . .will be served by [the] application").
's NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1943) (upholding FCC's authority to regulate "chain broadcasting").
" There is extremely well-developed literature regarding the FCC's various
regulatory mechanisms and policies. See generally POWE, supra note 54 (arguing
that first amendment rights of broadcasters should be equal to those of the print
media); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 4 (arguing for the deregulation of broadcasting); Spitzer, supra note 5 (favoring a system of private property rights for the
broadcast spectrum).
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latory challenges that tested the breadth of the previous judiciary holdings. Since the Supreme Court had never explicitly
validated the FCC's powers, the FCC's efforts to regulate network broadcasting, contractual rights between networks and
their affiliates, and to control content of certain broadcasts
came into question.
In 1943, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States65
("NBC") gave the Court the opportunity to clarify and limit the
public interest standard. In NBC, the Court examined the
legality of the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations"
and concluded that the Communications Act of 1934 conferred
the requisite authority upon the Commission to promulgate
such regulations. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
analogized the Commission to a "traffic cop," vested with the
power to police the wavelengths and prevent stations from
interfering with each other. 6' The Court added, however, that
the 1934 Act "puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic," and that "[iln the context of the developing problems to which it was directed, the
Act gave the Conimission not niggardly but expansive powers."69 The public interest, the Court continued, "is ... the

interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective
use of radio." ° The Court noted that radio frequencies, unlike
other modes of communication, are limited and therefore not
available to all.7 It is precisely the finite nature of the spectrum, according to the NBC court, that subjects it to government regulation.72
'

319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).

" Chain broadcasting was defined in the Communications Act of 1934 as the

"simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1988). Chain broadcasting was achieved largely by
transmitting programs via telephone lines from the original station to other stations in the network. For an interesting discussion of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company's early interest in facilitating chain broadcasting, see
BARNOUW, supra note 4, at 43-48.
67 NBC, 319 U.S. at 216.
68

Id.

61 Id. at 219.
70 Id. at 216 (quoting 1934 Act). Significantly, the Court in NBC largely sidestepped the network's contention that the chain broadcasting rules impinged on
their first amendment freedoms. Id. at 226.
71Id. at 216.
72NBC, 319 U.S. at 216.
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For twenty-five years following the NBC case, the Supreme Court remained largely silent regarding the regulation
of broadcast media. In 1969, however, in the seminal case, Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Court unanimously upheld
the constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine."7" This doctrine,
which had been promulgated in different forms and with a
varying number of corollaries since 1929, required broadcasters
to present both sides of controversial issues that were the
subject of broadcasts.7 4
Unlike previous decisions such as KFKB, Trinity Methodist, and NBC, the Court in Red Lion focused on the first
amendment rights of broadcasters.7 5 The Court found that
although broadcasters have first amendment rights, these
rights are not as extensive nor as inviolable as those of the
print media.7" The scarce nature of the wavelength spectrum,
the Court argued, limits the number of voices that can be
heard at any given time and therefore gives government the
ability to set content requirements in order to maximize the

73 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
" The fairness doctrine has been the subject of numerous articles, commentaries and FCC reports. See, e.g., In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910, 102 F.C.C.2d
142 (1985) (report by FCC detailing history and status of the fairness doctrine and
concluding that the doctrine serves the public interest); Federal Communications
Comm'n, Laying the Fairness Doctrine to Rest: Was the Doctrine's Elimination
Really Fair?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 994 (1990) (discussing District of Columbia
Circuit Court cases that afirmed the FCC's decision to eliminate the fairness
doctrine); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151
(arguing that the fairness doctrine is incoherent and unworkable).
" Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369-71. The Red Lion Broadcasting Company operated
radio station WGCB in Pennsylvania. Id. at 371. On November 27, 1964, WGCB
carried a broadcast by the Reverend Billy Hargis in which Hargis attacked Fred
Cook, the author of a book entitled Goldwater-Extremist on the Right. Id. Hargis
alleged that Cook had been fired by a newspaper because he levied false charges
against city officials, worked for a Communist affiliated magazine, the Nation, had
defended Alger Hiss, and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence
Agency. Id. at 371 & n.2. Following this broadcast, Cook demanded an opportunity
to respond to Hargis. Cook also requested a tape, transcript and summary of the
broadcast. Id. at 371-72. WGCB refused this request and the FCC declared that
the Hargis broadcast was a personal attack on Cook and that Red Lion had failed
to meet its obligations under the fairness doctrine. Id. at 372.
71 Id.
at 386-87. This double standard became crystal clear with the Court's
decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which
struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to provide reply space for
persons who had been discussed in an unfavorable light. Red Lion made this type
of regulation permissible in relation to broadcasters.
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public benefits derived from broadcasting.7 7 By imposing requirements on broadcasters to air opposing viewpoints, the
fairness doctrine increased overall discussion, thereby serving
the purpose of the First Amendment." Consequently, through
the Commission, the federal government has the power not
only to license stations and choose between competing applicants, but to require that stations present both sides of controversial topics and to mandate on-air replies by persons who
may have been attacked on a previous program.79
Red Lion marked the culmination of forty years of legislation, regulation and jurisprudence concerning broadcasting. In
Red Lion, the Court affixed its seal of first amendment imprimatur on the scarcity doctrine and determined broadcasting's
lower status in the hierarchy of first amendment protections.
In effect, the Court, Congress and the FCC created a separate
and lower level of first amendment protections for broadcasting. Unlike the print media, for example, where most restrictions on the content of publications had been struck down,"
by the late 1960s the broadcast media were far more limited in
their ability to air anti-majoritarian viewpoints."'

"' Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88.
at 389-90. The Court stated that "the purpose of the First Amendment
[is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id. at 390.
71 Id.
at 369. With the expansion of broadcast television stations, the widespread availability of cable television, and the development of satellite-based television, it is questionable whether the spectrum scarcity argument is still persuasive.
See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 4, at 221; Spitzer, supra note 5, at
1018-19. But see Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457
(1994) ("Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale
since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support
for our broadcast jurisprudence." (citations omitted)).
"' See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (to recover
for libel one must demonstrate actual malice); see also Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1973) (striking down a fairness doctrine corollary for
print media); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down
a state procedure for preventing the publication of "malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspapers"); Lee C. Bolinger, Jr., Freedom of the Cross and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L.
REV. (1976) (comparing print and broadcast media and arguing that the latter
should be subject to greater restriction than the former).
" See generally Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
71 Id.
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Perhaps nowhere else are the limitations placed on broadcasters first amendment rights more apparent than in the
restriction of indecent and offensive broadcasts. The intellectual support for these limitations rests on the scarcity doctrine
as well as on explicit and implicit assumptions about the purpose, power, and potential- of the broadcast media. Analyzing
these restrictions and their justifications provide a framework
and mechanism for examining the constitutionality of restrictions on violence on television.
C. Indecency, Offensiveness and Television
From the late 1960's to the mid-1970's, indecency on television emerged as a national issue. Although national attention previously had turned to the issue of television and its
negative effects on society as a whole" 2 -and on children in
particular-during this period attention focused on the subject
of indecency. In response, Congress directed the FCC to issue a
report detailing its efforts to control the prevalence of violence,
sex and obscenity on broadcast television.8 3
Consequently, in 1975, the FCC issued a Report and Opinion that set forth a definition for "indecent" material and articulated the reasons for restricting indecent programming.'
The Commission defined indecent as "language that describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a

82 See supra note 41.

,' See BARNOUW, supra note 4, at 474. The Commission met informally with
network executives to propose methods to reduce the amount of sex and violence
on television. Id. The result of these meetings was the "Family Viewing" period
that the television networks adopted in 1975. Id. at 475. This policy directed that
between the hours of 7:00 and 9:00 P.M., the television networks would schedule
programs that were free of violence and sexually explicit material. Id. The networks never assiduously enforced the policy and the "Family Viewing" period ultimately was declared unconstitutional because the FCC had applied pressure on
the networks to institute the policy without a public hearing or other statutorily
mandated administrative procedures. Writers Guild of America v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064, 1140, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
84 Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418 (1985); In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
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reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."85 The
FCC claimed that its primary regulatory interest was to protect children from words and ideas it believed most parents
would find offensive. 6
The FCC's actions and the national debate over "indecent"
8
broadcasts culminated with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.
This case involved an administrative judgment against WBAI,
a New York radio station, for broadcasting an "indecent" monologue by comedian George Carlin.88 In Pacifica, a plurality of
the Court found that the Commission had the power under
statutory law to regulate indecent speech over the airwaves.89
Unlike earlier decisions, however, the Court did not rest its
reasoning solely on the fairness doctrine or the limited first
amendment rights of broadcasters.'
The plurality articulated additional justifications for treating broadcasting differently from other forms of communication. First, Justice Stevens noted that "broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans." 9 Therefore, he surmised, the rights of the listener to be left alone in the "privacy of the home" outweigh the
First Amendment rights of the broadcaster.92 Second, Justice

56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1506 (D.C. Cir.

"

1991).
87 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

Id. at 730. The broadcast of Carlin's monologue occurred at 2:00 P.M on
Tuesday, October 30, 1973. The substance of the broadcast included:
"you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um,the ones you definitely
would's [sic], ever ....
The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will
curve your spine, grow hair on your hands .

.

. and maybe, even bring

us, God help us, peace without honor... un, and a bourbon."
In re Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 100 (appendix).
' Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 737-38. The Commission had acted pursuant to both 18
U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication," and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), which requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in
the public interest."
"0Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742, 748. The Court, however, relied on the decisions
in RFKB, Trinity Methodist, NBC, and Red Lion, all which cited the scarcity doctrine as support for the Commission's general regulatory power.
9' Id. at 748.
92 Id. at 748 (referring to the broadcaster in this context as an "intruder"). In
his dissent, Justice Brennan cited the circuit court decision, which analogized the
listener in Pacifica with the courthouse visitor in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
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Stevens maintained that broadcasting is "uniquely accessible
to children" and the content of such broadcasts may be restricted to protect children from indecent broadcasts. 3 Finally, Justice Stevens proposed that certain forms of speech-such as
indecent and offensive speech-are less valuable than other
forms of speech-such as political speech or "core" speech-and
therefore should be subject to greater regulation.94 Although
this "lower value speech" rationale was joined by only two
other justices, it has appeared in other cases" and is useful in
analyzing proposed regulations restricting violence on television."
Pacifica signalled the natural culmination of the Court's
previous rulings regarding the Commission's powers to regulate and limit speech in the broadcast spectrum. Coming on
the heels of Red Lion, Pacifica marked the continuation of the
line of cases broadcasting which assigned a lower status in the
first amendment hierarchy. Yet in relation to indecency cases
not involving broadcasting, the Pacifica decision represented a
departure from emerging first amendment law.97 Although

(1971) (finding a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" to be protected speech) and the passerby in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
(striking down an ordinance as overbroad even though nudity displayed on an outdoor screen was visible to a passerby). Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 764-65 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the listener elects to receive radio broadcasts and can merely turn the radio off or change the station if the listener is
offended. The "minimal discomfort' suffered by an offended listener does not outweigh the "broadcaster's right to send, and the right of those interested to receive,
a message entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 749-50.
at 746-47.
" Id.
" Justice Stevens's "lower value of speech" argument first surfaced in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (upholding a Detroit ordinance that required adult movie theaters to be geographically distributed); see also
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (upholding municipal
ordinance that concentrated adult theaters into particular zones of the city); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 548 (1980)(First
Amendment bar to New York regulatory agency's prohibition on inclusion of inserts that discussed public policy into customer's monthly electric bills) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (striking down a regulatory agency's prohibition on inclusion of inserts that discussed public policy issues into customers' monthly electric bills). In
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice Souter noted that "protection of sexually explicit expression may be of lesser societal importance than the protection of other
forms of expression." 501 U.S. 560, 586 n.3 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (upholding an Indiana ban on public nudity).
96 See infra notes 285-95 and accompanying text.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Erznoznik v. Jackson-
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the FCC had dealt with indecency cases previously by imposing fines or revoking licenses," Pacifica signalled the Supreme Court's validation, albeit narrowly, of the agency's constitutional authority to regulate indecent speech.
In the years following Pacifica, the FCC narrowly construed the decision as only allowing it to punish those broadcasters who repetitively used any of the "seven dirty words"
before 10:00 P.M.99 As a result, the Commission did not significantly exert its power to restrict potentially indecent broadcast material.' In fact, between 1975 and 1987, the FCC did
not find any broadcasts to be actionable on the basis of
indecency.'0 ' Then in 1987, the Commission issued three decisions that indicated new-found vigor in the restriction of
broadcasts it deemed indecent.0 2 In these decisions, the Commission announced that it was resurrecting its pre-Pacifica
definition of indecent broadcasting and would bring actions
against violators of that revived standard.' 3 The Commission

vile, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); infra notes 142-76 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970) (forfeiture imposed for
use of indecent language); In re Jack Straw Memorial Found., 21 F.C.C.2d 833
(1970) (license reduced to short term renewal status due to indecent language); In
re E.G. Robinson, 33 F.C.C. 250 (license revoked due to a pattern of using indecent language), aff'd sub nom., Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
" Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that FCC's definition for indecency was not overbroad, but also finding
that the FCC failed to consider adequately alternatives and offer reasoned support
for its regulation channeling indecent broadcasts to between midnight and six A.M.)
[hereinafter "ACT 1"].
"® Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that FCC's order implementing a 24-hour ban on all indecent broadcasts
was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) [hereinafter ACT II].
101 Id. at 1506.
12 See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1336. The three decisions that marked the FCC's
new enforcement policies were In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705
(1987) (finding that portions of Howard Stern's talk-show broadcast between 6:00
and 10:00 A.M. was actionable); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703
(1987) (broadcast of a song with explicit lyrics, Makin' Bacon, on a Saturday night
after 10:00 P.M. was actionable); In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987)
(broadcast of excerpts of play entitled Jerker broadcast between 10:00 and 11:00
P.M. were indecent). Id.
10 See New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast
and Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987); see also ACT II, 932 F.2d
at 1506. The definition for indecency adopted by the FCC was identical to that
which appeared in its 1975 report: "language or material that, in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community

1994]

REGULATING VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION

1125

justified its change of direction by claiming that the old "seven
the broadcast
dirty words" standard was too narrow to prevent
1 4
of material that may be injurious to children.
These three FCC decisions as well as the FCC's Public
Notice summarizing its new enforcement policy 1 5 and the
Reconsideration Order affirming it' were challenged by several broadcasters. °7 The broadcasters asserted that the new
standards were inherently vague and overbroad. Furthermore,
they argued that the channeling portions of the decisions (directing broadcasters to restrict indecent broadcasts to late
hours thus limiting the risk that children are in the audience)
were arbitrary and would "reduce adults to seeing and hearing
material fit only for children."' 8
In particular, the FCC's new-found vigor for enforcing its
pre-Pacificaindecency standards led to an extended legal battle between the FCC and the District of Columbia Circuit
Court. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT "), a
decision written by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed, remanded and vacated in part the actions of the FCC.' 9 The court agreed with
the FCC that the "seven dirty words" standard was too narrow
and could "yield anomalous, even arbitrary, results.""' The
court also found that the FCC's revised definition for "indecent" speech was substantially the same as that affirmed in
Pacifica."' The court accepted the FCC's justification for its
new approach, finding it acceptable to channel indecent material, "in order to shelter children from exposure to words and
phrases their parents regard as inappropriate for them to
hear.""' The court, however, found there to be too little information on children's viewing habits to allow meaningful re-

standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs."
Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d
418, 425 (1975).
"o ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1338.
105 New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726.
106 Id.
*" See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1338.
'08 Id. at 1338-41.
109 Id.

m Id. at 1338.
852 F.2d at 1338.

1,

12

Id. at 1340.
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strictions on the times at which indecent material could be
aired.' Thus, the court remanded this issue and concluded
that, although indecent speech is constitutionally protected,
the FCC may restrict it to protect children through reasonable
and "securely grounded" restrictions."'
The Commission never had the opportunity to reformulate
or provide rational support for its channeling policies. Instead,
two months after the court's decision in ACT I, Congress
passed and the President Bush signed legislation that directed
the Commission to enforce a twenty-four hour ban on indecent,
obscene and profane speech." 5 After a hearing, the Commission issued its opinion that a blanket ban on indecent speech
was constitutional because there was a "'reasonable risk that
significant numbers of children ages 17 and under listen to
radio and view television at all times.""'" Therefore nothing
but a total ban would serve the government's "compelling interest in protecting children from broadcast indecency."" 7
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Action for
Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IT'), examined the constitutionality of a total ban on broadcast indecency."' Opponents
of the FCC's plan argued that the FCC's indecency definition
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad."' The court,

Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1344.
11 Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988); see also Act II, 932 F.2d
at 1507. Enforcement of the ban was stayed pending judicial review. See Action
for Children's Television v. F.C.C., No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 1989). During
this review, the Supreme Court held that a blanket ban on indecent commercial
telephone messages ("phone sex") was unconstitutional because there were less
restrictive alternatives available to prevent children from accessing these messages.
Sable Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Believing that part of
the rationale behind the Sable decision-that if there were no other less-restrictive
ways to prevent access by children such messages could be used to justify a total
ban-the Commission sought and obtained a remand from the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit to marshal evidence showing that a 24-hour ban was the only
viable means to prevent children's exposure to indecent speech. ACT II, 932 F.2d
at 1507. Following solicitation of public comment on the ban, the Commission issued its report enforcing a total ban on indecent speech over the airwaves. Id.
"' ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507.
117 Id.
118 Act II came to the Circuit Court after a previous restriction that barred the
airing of indecent broadcasts before midnight had been struck down. ACT I, 852
F.2d 1332, 1338-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
113
114

'1 932 F.2d at 1507.
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however, refused to review the issues of vagueness and overbreadth and concluded that "our holding in ACT I precludes us
from now finding the Commission's generic definition of indecency to be unconstitutionally vague." 20 Yet the court also
reaffirmed the first amendment protection of indecent speech
provided and held that a blanket
ban on indecent speech, in
12
any medium, is unconstitutional.

Responding to the ACT H decision, Congress passed section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992.22

Through this Act, Congress retreated from its earlier insistence
on a total ban of indecent programming. It directed the FCC to
promulgate regulations prohibiting indecent programming on
any public radio or television station between 6:00 A.M. and
10:00 P.M., and between 6:00 A.M. and 12:00 midnight on commercial radio and television stations." In the resulting administrative order, the FCC justified the channeling of indecent broadcasts to specific times as necessary to protect children and unreceptive adults from indecent language and programs." Relying on Pacifica, the Commission maintained
that the government had a compelling interest in protecting
children from the harmful effects of indecent television and
radio broadcasts, and that channeling offered a narrowly tailored means to achieve this end. 12 Parroting the plurality in
Pacifica,the FCC contended that "a requirement that indecent
language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language." 26
12

Id. at 1508.

Id. at 1508-09. The court argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), supported this conclusion and that
the fact that Congress mandated the 24-hour ban did not change the unconstitutional nature of the restriction. Sable struck down a congressionally imposed ban
on indecent phone messages ("phone sex") because there was no showing that a
total ban was justified as a means to protect minors. See infra notes 132-35 and
accompanying text.
12 Action for Children's Television v. FCC 11 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Act III].
123 In re Enforcement of Prohibitions against Broadcast Indecency, 8 F.C.C.R.
704 (1993).
121

124 Id. at 706.
'2 Id. at 706.

.2Id. at 710 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 743 18 (1978)).
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A third challenge to the FCC's assertions was brought in
1993, in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. Once
more the court struck down the FCC indecency regulations."'
The FCC argued that its 6:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight ban on
indecent broadcasts should satisfy judicial scrutiny because it
was narrowly tailored. 2 ' The FCC also maintained that this
regulation was necessary to help parents supervise their
children's television habits and to satisfy the government's
interest in protecting children from harmful influences. 29'
The court rejected these arguments and held that in drafting its regulations the FCC had not adequately considered the
rights of adult viewers. Furthermore, the court stated that it
was "at a loss to detect any reasoned analysis supporting the
particular safe harbor mandated by Congress."'30 The court
concluded that in order to secure approval of such regulations,
Congress and the FCC must explain the scope of the
government's interest, produce a well-reasoned definition of
"children," provide information indicating when children are
reasonably likely to be in the viewing audience, and provide
station- and program-specific audience data reflecting the age
of viewers.' 3 '
Prior to the circuit court's decision in ACT II, the Supreme
Court accorded significant weight to the precedential value of
Pacifica when it struck down a twenty-four hour ban on indecent telephone messages (commonly known as "phone sex") in
Sable Communications v. FCC."2 Although the Court rejected the government's contention that Pacifica gave the FCC
1- ACT III, 11 F.3d 170.
'2 Id. at 173-74.
12" Id. at 176-77. The FCC also argued that there was an independent governmental interest in protecting adult viewers from exposure to indecent broadcasts.
The court rejected this argument on two grounds: first, that despite the
government's contention, Pacifica could not be read to create a compelling governmental interest in protecting adults from exposure to indecent speech and that
such a holding would "run counter to the fundamental principle of the First
Amendment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wideopen." id. at 175 (citation omitted) and second, the government's stated interest in
protecting adults is undermined by the regulation's provision that submission of
data showing no appreciable child audience is a valid defense to a charge of airing
indecent broadcasts outside of the safe harbor time period. Id. at 176.
10 Id.

at 177.

Id. at 183.
...
2 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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power to regulate indecent telephone messages, 133 it echoed
Pacifica when it distinguished broadcasting from telephone
communications. Broadcasting, noted the court, is "uniquely
pervasive" that is, it can "intrude on the privacy of the home
without prior warning as to program content and is 'uniquely
accessible to children. ' 1 34 Consequently, the court held that
broadcasting can be regulated to a greater degree than, for
example, an indecent telephone conversation that requires the
listener to take greater affirmative steps to receive the communication.1 35 Thus, in striking the restriction on telephone
speech the Court reaffirmed the vitality of Pacifica, a decision
that allowed significant restrictions on broadcasted speech.
Concurrently with the debate surrounding indecent television and radio broadcasts, Congress regained interest in limiting violence on television. In 1988 and 1989, congressional
hearings exploring legislative actions to reduce the level of
televised violence resulted in the Television Progam Improvement Act of 1990 ("T.V. Act").3 6 This Act exempted broadcasters from anti-trust laws for three years. To facilitate meetings between the three major networks, Fox Broadcasting,
cable operators and independent stations, for the purpose of
helping Congress devise ways to reduce television violence.3
The T.V. Act ultimately proved to be largely ineffective in its
goal to bring these different companies together. In fact, ABC,
CBS and NBC did not meet until two years after passage of
the Act.138 At that time, they announced that they had agreed
on various "guidelines" to reduce violence on television.3 9
These guidelines, however, were broad, undefined and failed to
satisfy Congress. 40 Consequently, Congress reconvened hear'33 Id. at 127.
134 Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748-40 (1978)).
I" Id. at 127-28 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49).
.3 47 U.S.C. § 303c (Supp. III 1991).
137 See Julia W. Schlegel, The Television Violence Act of 1990: A New Program
for Government Censorship?, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 187 (1993) (arguing that despite
constitutionality of the Television Violence Act it is unlikely to reduce violence on
television). Prior to passage of this Act, anti-trust laws had barred these television
companies from cooperating with each other in developing programming guidelines.
Id. at 240.
138

Id. at 194.

129 Id.

The guidelines proposed by the broadcast networks were designed to "prohibit depicting violence as glamorous or using it to shock or stimulate the audience."
1..
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ings on the issue in 1993 when numerous bills were introduced
to force broadcasters to reduce violence on television."'
In the past eighty years, the courts, Congress and the FCC
have carved a separate legal niche for television broadcasting.
Within this niche, the FCC has been granted enormous power
to determine the means, the mode and the content of broadcasts. The courts have largely deferred to the FCC's judgment
regarding both technical issues-such as chain broadcasting
and frequency settings-and substantive issues-such as restrictions on the dissemination of certain political and social
ideas or the expression of obscene, indecent and offensive
speech. The courts' rationale for such restrictions has been
based upon the scarcity of the spectrum, the pervasiveness and
power of the medium, and children's accessibility to television
and radio. The courts have largely deferred to the FCC when
the FCC acts to protect children, even when such regulations
deprive adults access to indecent, though protected, material.
The constitutional status of broadcasting and the
government's ability to regulate the content of broadcasts is
crucial to discerning the constitutionality of regulations that
restrict violence on television. Any legislation directed at regulating televised violence must comport with the special rules
that have developed around television.
III. RESTRICTIONS

ON

SPEECH:

THE

NON-BROADCASTING

CONTEXT

The separate constitutional niche created for broadcasting
does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it coexists with general
principles of first amendment law which have developed concurrently with the widespread use of broadcasting. In order to
understand and evaluate the constitutionality of restrictions on
violence, the contours of first amendment law outside of the
broadcasting context must be explored. This discussion is valuable for understanding the peculiar first amendment status of
broadcasting and the regulations involving violence and broadcast media. It also provides several different analytical frameworks and core principles of first amendment law that will be
Id. at 194.
141 See supra note 7.
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used to examine and dissect the issues surrounding the efforts
to regulate violence on television.
Several different lines of cases affect the constitutionality
of efforts to regulate violent television programming. These
cases can be roughly divided into three areas of first amendment law: 1) offensiveness and indecency; 2) obscenity; and 3)
the state's interest in protecting children. In each of these areas, the Court's rationale for allowing certain speech restrictions and the state interests involved create the first amendment framework that surrounds restrictions on speech and
highlight the differences between broadcasting and non-broadcasting content-based regulations.
A. Indecent and Offensive Speech
As noted earlier, the efforts to control the amount and type
of violence on television are largely based on the arguments
used to justify the general regulation and restriction of indecent and offensive speech. 4 2 Indeed, advocates of restricting
indecent and offensive speech typically group violent and sexual behavior together when trying to justify the control of
both.' Thus, it is necessary to examine the first amendment
status of indecent and offensive speech to assess whether regulations directed at limiting the amount and types of violence on
television are constitutional. Although this issue has been
examined in the context of broadcast regulations, it is useful to
explore the protection afforded to indecent and offensive speech
in settings other than broadcasting.
Generally, indecent and offensive speech is given complete
protection by the First Amendment.' The current constitutional status of indecent and offensive speech, however, includes restrictions on this speech in a number of situations. In
addition to restrictions on broadcasting indecent speech, restrictions have been upheld where local economic development
and quality of life is threatened, 45 where children's social de4
1
144

See supra note 11.
See supra note 11.
See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (sexual expression

that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding right of anti-war protestor to publicly
wear jacket emblazoned with the phrase "Fuck the Draft").
1"
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding
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velopment is perceived to be at risk,' or where the rights of
adults not to be confronted with indecent or offensive speech,
within certain contexts, are thought to be in jeopardy. "7 The
regulations that the Court approves for limiting speech when
these interests are threatened provides a view as to how violence on television may be regulated through a similar approach.
The modern seminal case addressing offensive and inde4 8 In Cocent speech is the 1971 case of Cohen v. California.'
hen, a student walked into the municipal court wearing a jacket with the inscription "Fuck the Draft."4 Cohen defended
his action by arguing that this message constituted speech and
that the state's efforts to restrict that speech because of its
perceived offensiveness violated the First Amendment."' The
Court agreed, and rejected the state's contention that Cohen's
jacket had thrust offensive words on unsuspecting and unwilling members of the citizenry.'5 ' Significantly, the Court concluded that although a citizen has a right not to be confronted
with offensive messages in the privacy of one's home,'5 2 such
a right does not necessarily exist when a citizen is in a public
place.'5 3 This is particularly true, noted the Court, where ofordinance that required geographical dispersion of adult theaters).
146

See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute that

barred the sale of indecent material to minors); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of a ban on child pornography constitutional even where that pornography was not legally obscene).
147 Primarily, the Court has demonstrated an interest in protecting the privacy
of one's home and in contexts where the audience cannot easily avoid exposure.
See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding
federal law that allowed an addressee to prevent the mailing of materials that the
addressee found personally offensive); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (upholding a city ban designed to protect residents from unwanted directed
picketing). But cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down
municipal ordinance that banned hate speech).
1- 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
149 Id.
1 0 Id. at 18-20.
11 Id. at 21-22.
112 Id.
at 21; see also Rowan, 397 U.S. at 733. In Rowan, the Court placed
great emphasis on an individual's right to be "let alone," even in contexts where
the material is non-offensive to the majority of people and even when those materials contain "good" ideas. Id.
1"3 403 U.S. at 21. The differences between Cohen and Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948) and Rowan are apparent. One cannot avoid listening to a sound
truck broadcasting a political or commercial message. Saia, 334 U.S. at 563
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fended persons can avoid further "bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." 54 In effect, the Court
held that without a showing of "substantial privacy interests,"
a person in a public place must expect to encounter a certain
degree of offensiveness but that the exercise of First Amendment rights55 outweighed any discomfort an offended person
may suffer.

The acceptableness of the burden on the public to avoid
exposure to offensive language or images was further elucidated in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville.'56 In striking down an ordinance that prohibited the showing of nudity on any drive-in
movie screen visible to the public, Justice Powell argued that
without showing an invasion of substantial privacy interests,
the First Amendment severely restricted a state or
municipality's power to censor offensive speech.'57 "[Tihe
Constitution," continued the Court, "does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling
listener or viewer."' The limited privacy interest of a person

(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Similarly, although to a lesser degree, one cannot
avoid an obscene or indecent message that arrives in the mail at one's-home, a
place where one has a strong privacy interest. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736. Alternatively, Cohen's message, a written slogan with a clear political point embroidered
on the back of a jacket, could easily be avoided or might even go unnoticed.
15

403 U.S. at 21.

z' Id. at 23. Despite the fact that the Court in Cohen noted that "the State
has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us," in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 744
(1978), the Court argued that "there are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. In Paciftca,
the Court attempted to distinguish Cohen by arguing that broadcasting is a
unique medium. Id. at 762. Whereas, "Cohen's written message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a
child's vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.
The Court's efforts to distinguish Cohen and Pacifica illustrate the difficulties
in applying separate standards for ideas disseminated through broadcasting and
those disseminated through print media. To a large degree, the Court's justification for this difference rests with the effectiveness of broadcast media to distribute
information and affect thought and behavior. If this is the case, then the underlying philosophy of the First Amendment, that society benefits when there is a free
and robust exchange of ideas, is ill-served by a rule that restricts a speaker who
chooses the broadcast media to engage in the advocacy of ideas and viewpoints.
15

422 U.S. 205 (1975).

157 Id. at 210.
158 Id.
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on a public street, concluded the Court, cannot serve as justification for government-sponsored censorship of protected
speech."'
Unlike Pacifica, the Erznoznik Court rejected the state's
argument that the banning of nudity from films visible to the
public was a reasonable means of protecting minors from deleterious influences. 60 Even though the state had greater latitude in adopting controls to protect minors, the Court maintained that minors are still entitled to "significant" First
Amendment protection:' 6 ' "Speech that is neither obscene as
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription
cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."62
Jacksonville's ordinance, observed the Court, was not directed
at sexually explicit nudity, but all nudity "irrespective of context or pervasiveness."'63 Because the ordinance banned all
nudity, whether sexually explicit or not, the Court concluded
that the ordinance was broader than permissible and, therefore, void.'
119 Id.
16 Id. at 212.
161 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213.
162 Id. at 213-14. For a more detailed discussion of the First Amendment and

controlling the flow of information to minors, see infra notes 211-41 and accompanying text.
at 213.
16 Id.
Id. at 217. The dissent derided the majority for failing to provide adequate
1
support for the proposition that the burden falls on the public to ignore offensive
materials. Chief Justice Burger argued that different media, such as film, should
be judged by different standards so as to "meet the problems generated by the
need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in compact modern communities.'" Id. at 220 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 518 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Chief Justice Burger rejected the majority's contention that this case was similar
to either Cohen or Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (hanging an altered
American flag from window is protected expression). He argued that large, illuminated, color screens are designed to hold the attention of all observers, and asserted that whereas "[tihe radio can be turned off," the "billboard or street car placard" are always on. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 221 (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285
U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
For the dissent, the difference in media used to project a nude image justifies
a greater level of governmental restriction on the images projected. If those images
are "capable of revealing and emphasizing the most intimate details of human
anatomy," then the state may adopt measures to restrict them from public view.
Id. at 223. The dissent did not, however, offer any legitimate state reason, other
than traffic safety, for the restriction of nude images. Nowhere in the dissent is
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In striking down Jacksonville's ordinance, the Court relied
on the "overbreadth" doctrine.'6 5 This doctrine holds that a
statute that bars constitutionally proscribable material but
also sweeps within its coverage protected speech can be found
void on its face.'6 6 The rationale behind this doctrine is that
in their efforts to restrict unprotected speech, overbroad statutes and ordinances may deter or chill the legitimate exercise
of first amendment rights.6 7 For example, the challenged ordinance in Erznoznik could encompass all forms of nudity,
whether or not they were in an obscene context, including a
"baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from

there an explication as to why nude images pose a danger to public mores or
children's morality. Instead, the dissent merely maintains that because persons
viewing the drive-in movie image from outside of the drive-in facility cannot hear
the sound of the picture or view the entire work, the communicative value of such
speech is lost. Id. at 222. This argument misses the rationale underlying Cohen,
that in a complex and diverse society that values free expression, the First
Amendment protects the rights of speakers even if some of that speech offends the
sensibilities of some members of the public.
It also is worth noting that Chief Justice Burger's distinction between a projected image on a screen that cannot be turned off by an unwitting viewer and
the ability of a listener to turn off the radio vanished three years later in FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Stevens's opinion, which relied on the unique nature of
radio and the asserted inability for a listener to avoid unexpected program content
as a justification for restricting Carlin's monologue. 438 U.S. at 748. In so holding,
they sharply differed with Justice Brennan's dissenting argument that an individual voluntarily lets radio into his home and can easily turn it off. Id. at 765
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
"6 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213. This doctrine should be distinguished from the
similar though slightly different "void for vagueness" doctrine. A "void for vagueness" analysis examines primarily the definitions used to describe prohibited conduct, and is derived from notions of due process and notice, whereas the overbreadth doctrine focuses more on the type of conduct that the statute or ordinance
seeks to limit. See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Ooerbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Lili
Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
49 (1992/93) (reviewing the FCC's regulatory policy on broadcast television's sextalk shows).
166 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
16 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216. The contours of this doctrine are unclear. It
would appear that statutes that affect "conduct" are subject to the "substantial
overbreadth" doctrine. This doctrinal variation was announced in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (statutes that affect expressive conduct must be
"substantially overbroad" to be held unconstitutional). Statues that affect "speech,"
however, apparently are still subject to standard overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g.,
Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (striking down ordinance
that banned "all First Amendment" activities at Los Angeles International Airport).
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a culture in which nudity is indigenous."168 Thus, the ordinance restricted both protected and unprotected material.
Similar concerns about overbreadth arise with efforts to restrict violence on television.169
Even though Erznoznik found Jacksonville's ordinance
facially invalid on overbreadth grounds, the case extended the
principle of Cohen-that a speaker's first amendment rights
can outweigh a citizen's right not to be offended, whether by
printed words or visual images. 70 Ultimately Erznoznik was
the most protection provided to a speaker using an electronic
means of communication for public speech or conduct that
some might find offensive or indecent. 7' Although Erznoznik
allowed a drive-in movie theater which was visible from the
street to display some nudity, and thus, possibly offend some
members of the public, three years later in Pacifica the Court
ruled that this principle does not necessarily apply to other
forms of media such as radio and television.
With the constitutional contours of indecent and offensive
speech largely established, the Court turned next to the constitutionality of local efforts to use zoning ordinances to channel
or distribute "adult" movie theaters into special locations. Legislative justifications for establishing such ordinances, and the
Court's acceptance of such rationales, are analogous to the
FCC's early efforts to regulate the time during which indecent
broadcasts could be shown. Similarly, such zoning ordinances
are parallel to current efforts to channel televised violence into
particular times of the day.
Proponents of regulations to zone "adult" theaters argue
that these "content-neutral" restrictions are necessary to preserve the character of a community and prevent unwanted
"secondary effects" that these theaters bring such as crime and
declining property values.' The Court in Young v. American
Ernoznik, 422 U.S. at 213.
See infra notes 263-84 and accompanying text.
170 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
171 It is important to note that this limitation does not necessarily extend to
"'

movie theaters not visible to the general public. In these contexts, the Court has
displayed extreme wariness of governmental efforts to bar the showing of allegedly
indecent films. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring strict
procedural safeguards for film licensing schemes).
...Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 530 n.3 (9th Cir.
1984) (upholding zoning regulations aimed at adult theaters), aff'd, 475 U.S. 41
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Mini Theatres, Inc., 7 ' agreed that, because a "city's interest
in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that
must be accorded high respect," the "city must be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."'7 4 The Court noted that, unlike the
facts in Erznoznik, the Detroit ordinance at issue in American
Mini Theatres was not directed at the content of the speech
contained in the movies being shown at the theaters in question, but at the effect that such theaters had on general community development and character. 175 Detroit's attempt to
limit these negative secondary effects, did not totally preclude
adult theaters, but instead was a legitimate attempt on the
part of the Detroit Common Council to address problems
brought
on by the presence of such theaters in the communi6
17

ty.

The issue of secondary effects and the zoning of adult
theaters arose ten years later in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.,'77 where the Court upheld efforts to concentrate adult
theaters into specific zones. In both American Mini Theatres
and Renton, the zoning regulations at issue centered on "adult"
theaters and the purported secondary effects that such theaters had on the surrounding communities. Significantly, in
each case, the ordinances defined adult theaters as those theaters that presented visual depictions of specified "anatomical
areas" or "sexual activities." 78 These specified areas and activities clearly described which types of materials fell within
the zoning proscription. 9

(1986).

'3 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

" Id. at 71.
Id. at 71 n.34. The Court also distinguished Erznoznik in two other ways.
First, by pointing out that the secondary effects-impact on traffic-that Jackson175

ville purportedly sought to address through its ban on displays of nudity on drivein theater screens was not sufficiently supported by a factual basis. Second, the
Court noted that the statute in Erznoznik, which prohibited all nudity, was extremely broad, whereas the statute in American Mini Theatres carefully specified
the types of sexual activity that would trigger the zoning constraints. Id. at 71-72,
nn. 34-35.
178 Id. at 71.
'7 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
178 Id.
at 44.
"' The ordinance in Renton defined "Specified Sexual Activities" as: "a) Human

genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; b) Acts of human masturba-
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In Renton, the Court also accepted the city's argument
that its zoning regulations were content-neutral, seeking merely to prevent the secondary effects that such theaters have on
the community.8 0 By agreeing that the city's regulations
were content-neutral, the Court could apply a reduced level of
scrutiny. Thus, a community only needs to demonstrate that
such regulations serve a substantial and legitimate governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication.1 8 '
Finally, in Boos v. Barry,8 ' the Court further clarified its
secondary effects approach. In Boos, the Court struck down a
District of Columbia ordinance that barred any picketing critical of embassies of foreign governments within 500 feet of that
particular country's embassy.' 8' In so holding, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Stevens, distinguished
Renton by arguing that the listener's reaction to speech is not
considered a secondary effect.M Specifically, the Court noted
that although the regulation in Renton had applied to a "particular category of speech," the justification for such regulation
"had nothing to do with that speech."'85 The Court noted that
if the ordinance "was justified by the city's desire to prevent
the psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing
adult movies, then analysis of the measure as a content-based

tion, sexual intercourse or sodomy; c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human

genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breast." Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of
Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 529 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The ordinance also defined "Specified Anatomical Areas" as: "a) Less than completely and
opaquely covered human genitals, pubic region, buttock, and female breast below a
point immediately above the top of the areola; and b) Human male genitals in a
discernible turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered." Id. The ability
to describe and delineate those theaters exempt from zoning regulations is important. Indeed, this distinction is a key difference between the efforts to restrict
programming that contains violence and the zoning regulations present in both
American Mini Theatres and Renton. See infra notes 298-321 and accompanying
text.
" Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted).
181 Id. at 50. Justice Souter relied on the secondary-effects rationale of Renton
in his concurring opinion in the indecency case, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501
U.S. 560, 580-81 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (upholding state statute that prohibited public nudity in general and nude dancing in clubs in particular).
1- 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
183 Id.
1
1

Id.
Id.

at 321.
at 320.
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statute would have been appropriate."8 6
The Court's approach to secondary effects analysis raises
questions about whether similar regulations to limit the showing of violent movies-whether on a movie screen or on a private television-would be constitutional because of their perceived tendency to encourage violence and promote social degradation. Although the secondary effects window allows the
state to restrict speech that it perceives as increasing urban or
community blight, the precise size of this window and the
types of prohibitions that can fit through it are still undetermined.
What emerges from the Court's treatment of indecent and
offensive speech is the conclusion that offensive and indecent
speech, when removed from the context of broadcasting, is
entitled to a relatively high degree of protection. Whereas the
public has a limited right not to be confronted with indecent or
offensive speech in the home, there is a limited burden to be
exposed to such speech outside the home. This burden, however, does not necessarily prohibit local governments from seeking to control the secondary effects of indecent or offensive
speech.
The nature of the protections and restrictions placed on
indecent and offensive speech provide principles and frameworks that must be incorporated into any analysis of the violence on television debate. Thus, regulations that purport to
reduce or restrict violent imagery must balance the burden
placed on the citizenry to expect and tolerate offensive messages in public with the public's right to be free from such images
while at home. In addition, the secondary effects argument can
be extended to include the societal violence as a secondary
effect of televised violence. This extension is useful and illustrates many of the hazards of equating proscriptions on indecency with proposed restrictions on violence.

,"6Id. at 321. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice O'Connor's description of
Renton up to the point that secondary effects cannot include listeners' reaction to
speech. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring opinion). But he disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's application of Renton to a political speech case such as Boos and took
the opportunity to highlight the flaws in the Renton approach. Justice Brennan
argued that Renton creates "a possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can concoct 'secondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of
political speech." Id. at 335.
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B. Obscenity
Unlike indecent and offensive speech which is protected
but subject to a variety of restrictions, obscene speech has been
completely removed from first amendment safeguards. 8 ' By
analyzing the Court's approach to obscenity one can begin to
understand some of the problems with regulating violence on
broadcast television.
The Court's struggle to define and restrict obscene speech
has been one of the most controversial areas of first amendment law.' A number of decisions have set forth the standards for determining what is sexually obscene and have
claimed to articulate the justifications for restricting obscene
material. For example, in Roth v. United States,'8 9 the Court
addressed the constitutionality of criminal obscenity statutes. 9 ° The Court acknowledged that, although this was the
first time the issue of whether obscenity was protected speech
had "squarely presented" itself to the Court, previous cases
had indicated that obscenity was not entitled to first amendment protection.' 9 ' The author of the opinion, Justice

" See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1956).
" See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 79 (1973) (upholding a
ban on obscene material displayed to consenting adults).
9 354 U.S. 476 (1956).

0 Roth v. United States incorporated two challenges to a criminal obscenity
statute. First, Roth contested the constitutionality under the First Amendment of
the federal obscenity statute, which stated, in pertinent part: "[elvery obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or
other publication of an indecent character ....
[is declared to be nonmailable
matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or
by any letter carrier." Roth, 354 U.S. at 479 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1940)).
The second challenge centered on the constitutionality of the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code, which stated, in pertinent part, that a person
commits a misdemeanor if she:
3. Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps
for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or
designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene or indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise
makes any obscene or indecent figure; or,
4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement or any
such writing, paper, book, picture, print or figure ....
Id. at 479-80 n.2 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1955)).
...
Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
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Brennan, turned to history and after reviewing obscenity statutes dating back to colonial America, concluded that obscenity
is not protected speech.'92 The Court found that the "implicit"
history of the First Amendment dictates that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance" and therefore is not
entitled to first amendment protections.' Aside from a focus
on historical precedent, the need to protect minors, 9 4 and the
assertion that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social
importance,"'9 5 the Court was unwilling or unable to derive a
clear state interest in the prohibition of obscenity.
One of the principle problems with prohibiting a class of
speech like obscenity is the difficulty in defining what precisely
is obscene. In Roth, the Court recognized that not all expressions or publications containing sexual themes could be judged
obscene and therefore subject to restriction. 9 ' The Court
adopted a test for determining what is obscene and thus not
deserving of constitutional protection.'9 7 Instead of ending
the debate over obscenity, however, Roth marked the beginning of years of struggle to define obscenity adequately and to
provide justifications for restricting its dissemination. 9 ' Over

2 Id. at 482-85.
193 Id.

at 484. To support its contention that obscenity is unprotected speech,

the Court relied on its decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court presented a list of those classes of speech that do
not carry first amendment protection. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words . . . ." Id. at 571-72.
19 The need to protect minors from sexually explicit material was best articulated by Justice Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking ban
on the possession of obscene materials).
19 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
19 Id. at 476.
197 The Court adopted the following test: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
19 Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that
the "community standard" adopted by the majority was "inimical . . . to freedom
of expression" because it would allow juries to restrict matter related to "sexual
impurity' and establish a moral code that the government has no constitutional
authority to protect. Id. at 510-12. Justice Douglas compared Roth to Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), where the Court upheld an anti-subversion
law and stated that courts "must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted
by its improbability, justifies . . . invasion of free speech as . . . necessary to
avoid the danger." He concluded that the danger feared in Dennis could not be
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time, the Court's dissatisfaction with Roth's standard became
evident. For sixteen years after Roth, the Court struggled with
the issue of obscenity. "No fewer than 31 cases" were disposed
of by "per curiam reversals of convictions for the dissemination
of materials" that were deemed not to be obscene. 199
Finally, in Miller v. California,2 the Court altered the
test it had enunciated in Roth.0 1 Miller involved the
constitutionality of a California statute that barred the making
of obscene materials. In rendering its decision the court set
forth a three-part test to determine whether a particular work
should be judged obscene." 2 The test is: 1) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; 2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and 3) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.20 ' Like Roth, the Court in Miller, did not articulate a
state interest to justify the exclusion of obscenity from protected speech. Instead, the Court relied on a combination of
Brennan's historical analysis in Roth, precedent set by earlier
obscenity cases and on the broad assertion that minors needed
protection from obscene materials.2 4
One of the few instances where the Court has discussed
the state interest at stake in obscenity cases was in Miller's
companion case, ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton. °5 In upholdanalogized to something both as obtuse and as omnipresent as sexual thoughts.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 510.
Justice Harlan highlighted the connection between speech, thought and action,
yet maintained that a State could reasonably conclude that "pornography" needs to
be restricted because of its effect on the "moral fabric of society." Roth, 354 U.S.
476 (Harlan, J., concurring). Protecting morality, he believed, was a legitimate
state interest and could warrant restrictive state regulations. Id.
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82-83 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
20

21

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 47-48.

20 Id.
20

Id.

at 24.
at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The bulk of Brennan's dissent to the

Court's stance on obscenity was expressed in Miller's companion case, Paris Adult
Theatre, 413 U.S. at 70, where he argued that even with this test, obscenity cannot be defined so as to avoid problems of overbreadth. Id. at 83-84.
20 Miller, 413 U.S. at 19-20, 35.
20

413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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ing a Georgia ban on the public showing of an obscene film,
the Court pointed to the "arguable correlation between obscene
material and crime," and asserted that the nation and the
states have the right to "'maintain a decent society.' 2 °6 Significantly, the Court rejected the argument that the state needed to demonstrate conclusively that obscene material has adverse effects on adults. In such a situation, the state must only
show that it could reasonably determine that such a connection
207
exists.
The dissent argued that even though the majority opinions
in both Paris and Miller had proffered a few state interests
and a method to determine the obscene nature of a particular
work, the dissent argued that obscenity is a class of speech
that is "incapable of definition with sufficient clarity to withstand attack on vagueness grounds."2 8 Specifically, the concepts of "prurient interest," "patent offensiveness" and "serious
literary value" are too indefinite to provide adequate notice
and therefore create too great a risk of a chilling effect on
protected speech.0 0
Throughout the obscenity case, one of the few articulated
state interests justifying the prohibition of obscenity is the
belief that such speech harms the social and moral development of children.2 10 This argument, in turn, focuses attention
on the availability of such speech to children and the risk that
they might be accidentally or inadvertently exposed to such
material. Clearly, dissemination of obscenity by any means is
prohibitable because the entire category of obscene speech has
been proscribed. 1 With other types of speech that may be

206 Id. at 59-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting)).
2" Id. at 60. Considering the thousands of studies on the asserted connection
between televised violence and societal violence and the different conclusions that
can be derived from these studies, ParisAdult Theatre I is especially important. If
Congress, based upon its years of debate on this issue concluded that some form
of regulation was necessary, then it is unlikely the Court would strike down such
a regulation based on the question of causality.
2" Id. at 85-86 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 84.
210 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (striking down state law
that prohibited the possession of obscene materials).
21 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (upholding ban
on obscene telephone messages); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69,
93 (1973) (holding that first amendment protection of does not extend to obsceni-
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dangerous to children's development, however, the accessibility
of such speech to children becomes a relevant factor. Indeed,
the ubiquitous presence of television is used as an argument
for the strict control of programs containing violence in the
violence on television debate.2 12
C. Protectionof Children
Many of the decisions involving indecent and obscene material are founded upon a desire to protect minors from material deemed by adults to be injurious to children's social development. 2" This same concern is a primary reason behind support for a ban or restriction on televised violence.1 4 Over the
years, the Court has balanced the state's desire to protect children-deemed a "compelling interest"-with the constitutional
imperative of protecting the dissemination of material to consenting adults.215
The first amendment right of minors to receive protected
material, however, is limited. This limitation has its modern
2 s where the Court upheld
genesis in Prince v. Massachusetts,
a Massachusetts statute that prohibited boys under the age of
twelve and girls younger than eighteen from selling magazines,
and barred parents or any adults from supplying, compelling
or permitting the sale of such material by children. 2 7 The
Court noted that "a democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies" and, therefore, the legislature could adopt measures to protect the
growth and development of children even when those measures
limit parental freedom in matters regarding conscience and
religious conviction.2 18
These first amendment limitations on sexually indecent
ty).
212See, e.g., S. 1383, supra note 7 (recognizing that television "has established a
unique pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans").
213See, e.g, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
214See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
215 See Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (upholding a variable
obscenity standard for minors).
216 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
217Id. at 161-63.
218Id. at 168.
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materials were further elucidated in Ginsberg v. New York.21 s
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a New York statute that made it
a crime to knowingly sell to a minor any picture depicting
nudity.2 2 Despite the fact that the pictures sold were not obscene for adults, the Court adopted a variable obscenity standard for minors. The Court maintained that the state had an
independent interest in the well-being of its youth and, by
denying sexually explicit, though constitutionally protected
materials to minors, the state was merely protecting the ethical and moral development of youth."' The Court did not require the state to demonstrate a causal link between obscene
material and the degradation of the morals of youth. 2 Instead, it adopted a low standard of review and concluded that
New York's statute was rationally related to protecting minors

from harm."
Although the Court has adopted a more lenient approach
to laws that seek to restrict otherwise protected material from
being viewed by minors, several cases struck down these laws
because of their overbreadth or vagueness." These cases

219 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
' Id. at 645-46.
221

Id. at 641.

2 Id. at 641-42. Indeed, the Court acknowledged the fact that no causal link
between obscenity and the ethical and moral development of children had been
scientifically established. The Court noted that "wle do not demand of legislatures
'scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' We therefore cannot say that [a
statute], in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors
under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors
from harm." Id. at 642-43 (citation omitted).
Id. at 642-43. Although these cases address the protection of children's moral
and social development, they must be distinguished from the effort to ban child
pornography. The Court has upheld legal restrictions on the distribution and possession of materials that depict children in sexually explicit settings. See Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding ban on the possession of child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding ban on the distribution
of child pornography). In so holding, the Court has rejected first amendment challenges to such laws on the ground that the state interest in protecting the immediate and future well-being of children involved in the pornography industry far
outweighs any first amendment value of such material. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 10811. Unlike statutes that purport to protect children as an undefined societal group
from possible deleterious influences of sexually explicit or violent materials, child
pornography statutes clearly protect a well-defined group of children from exploitation and almost certain psychological and physical harm.
' See generally Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948).
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provide interesting and informative parallels between the present debate regarding violence on television and the historical
concern over the exposure of minors to printed and pictorial
material deemed to be harmful. Specifically, these cases expose
certain basic principles that will impact any consideration of
legislation restricting violence on television.
A case from the mid-1940s provides an early glimpse to
some of the arguments and definitional infirmities of restricting "violent" material because of its perceived effect on juveniles. In Winters v. New York, the Court struck down a law
that forbade selling or distributing to minors any material
likely to stimulate juvenile delinquency.22 5 The Court "recognize[d] the importance of the exercise of a state's police power
to minimize all incentives to crime,"22 6 but held that New
York's statute was too vague because it required "men of common intelligence ... to guess at the meaning of the enactment."2 27 Consequently, the Court concluded, the statue provided no notice to the public, making it impossible for the
"actor or the trier to know where this new standard of guilt
would draw the line between the allowable and the forbidden
publications." 2 8
The Court reached this conclusion even though the statute
had been narrowed in an earlier decision by the New York
Court of Appeals. The New York Court's limiting construction
of the statute had rested in part on extending the definition of
indecent or obscene speech2 29 to include "collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust.., so massed as to become

2 333 U.S. at 508-09. The New York statute being challenged was included in
the "indecency" article of the New York Penal Law and made it a misdemeanor if
a person
Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or
shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any
book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to
the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports,
or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds or bloodshed, lust or crime . ..
Id. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 (Consol. 1940)).
at 509.
' Id.
Id. at 515.
'

Id. at 519.

'

Winters, 333 U.S. at 514.
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vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes."3 0 The Supreme Court, however, found that the terms of this definition---"massed" and "vehicles for inciting violent and depraved
crimes"-were clauses that required no "intent or purpose,"
and that they proscribed a particular type of indecency or obscenity
,, 1 that heretofore had "no technical or common law mean-

ing. )2

This refusal to extend the concepts of indecency and obscenity to include depictions of violent acts presaged the current debate concerning violence on television. Although the
Winter Court had based its decision on vagueness grounds and
had largely avoided a prolonged investigation of the substantive first amendment issues involved, the problem presented to
the Court is not dissimilar to the definitional uncertainties and
problems raised by the debate on television violence. Unlike
other cases discussing statutory vagueness, Winters is distinct
because it is the only Supreme Court case to specifically discuss extending the definition of indecent or obscene material to
include depictions of violence. 2
A decade after Winters, another Supreme Court case, Butler v. Michigan, enunciated a key principle that still effects
the constitutional assessment of many of the proposals to restrict violence on television. In Butler, the Court struck down a
Michigan statute that barred making available to the public
any book that may have a deleterious influence on youth.'
The Court concluded that such a broad statute was "not reasonably restricted to the evil which it is said to deal" and has
the effect of reducing the adult population to reading only
what is fit for children. 5 This final concern, that to safeguard children adults also could be prevented from accessing

Id. at 513-14.
at 519.
' Recently, however, two cases have addressed the extension of indecency and
obscenity to include depictions of violence. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (striking down Missouri statute that
barred the dissemination of video cassettes depicting violence to minors), aff'd, 968
F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992); Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d
520 (Tenn. 1993) (upholding state statute that restricted the display of materials
harmful to minors but finding the term "excess violence" to be void for vagueness).
23

23'Id.

23 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2" Id. at 383.
23

Id.

1148

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1101

protected material, surfaces in other cases and is central to
any analysis of restrictions on television violence.23 6
Indeed, the concerns mentioned in Butler also were raised
over thirty years later by the Court in Sable Communications
of California v. FCC,"37 where the Court held that a ban on
indecent telephone messages (so-called "dial-a-porn" services)
far exceeded that necessary to prevent minors from being exposed to such messages." s Although the Court upheld a ban
on obscene telephone messages contained in the same legislation, it rejected Congress's attempt to institute a complete ban
on indecent messages. In so doing, however, the Court reiterated its belief that the state has a "compelling interest in protecting 9 the physical and psychological well-being of mi23
nors"
In seeking to restrict minors' access to indecent media,
however, the Sable Court was clear that the restrictive means
used must be narrowly drawn so as not to interfere with the
adult population's right to receive such messages." The
Court rejected arguments by the FCC and Congress that a
twenty-four hour ban on indecent telephone messages was the
only means available to insure that children were not exposed
to these messages." The only supportive evidence the Court
could find for such an assertion was conclusory statements
made by proponents of the bill." 2 Moreover, the Court noted
that the twenty-four hour ban was instituted despite the presence of other, less extreme means to control access to indecent
messages.24 3 Thus, in finding Congress's total ban on indecent phone messages unconstitutional, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to both the role government should play in securing the moral well-being of children and to the constitutional

" See, e.g., Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989);
infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
238 Id. at 131.
' Id. at 126 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)); see
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (upholding state statute that

banned child pornography).
240Id. at 131.
241Id. at 128.
242Id. at 129.
21 Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128. These other means included restricting access to credit card holders or those with a pre-designated access code.
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requirement that restrictions be narrowly tailored so as not to
unduly impede adult access to indecent messages.'
The four different areas of constitutional law discussed
above-broadcasting restrictions, indecency, obscenity regulations and efforts to protect children-provide the groundwork
necessary to analyze proposals surrounding restrictions on
television violence. The present nature and status of broadcasting, various definitional issues, secondary effects analysis, the
goals of the state and the means to achieve those goals are all
fundamental to a discussion of violence on television.
IV. ANALYSIS
First amendment law as it applies to broadcasting provides a framework to analyze the constitutionality of efforts to
regulate televised violence. The legal procedures, regulations
and substantive rules that guide the FCC, broadcasters and
the courts in determining the nature and content of broadcasts,
however, do not operate independent of other areas of first
amendment law. Rules applied to broadcasters must be analyzed in relation to general first amendment doctrine. Any
analysis of televised violence must consider the specific nature
of restrictions on it, including the terms used to define violence, the role of violence in media generally and the value of
violence as a means of expression.
A. Madonna and The Terminator: The Inapplicability of
Extending the Sexual Indecency Framework to Violence
As illustrated above, certain types of speech have been
classified by the Court as falling outside the scope of first
amendment protections and, therefore, subject to restriction.245 Obscene speech falls entirely outside of first amendment protections." 6 Indecent and offensive speech is protected, although this protection is limited especially within the
context of broadcasting.' Moreover, indecent and offensive
Id.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene speech); see also
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); supra notes
187-212 and accompanying text.
246 413 U.S. at 20.
247 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech subject to re244
24
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speech has been defined to include only explicit sexual and
excretory activities, whereas depictions of violence heretofore
have been undefined and unrestricted. 8 Yet, the current debate over televised violence revolves around the assumption
that televised violence can be restricted in a manner similar to
sexual indecency or sexual obscenity, and that these restrictions on violence can be justified with the same reasoning as
that used to regulate broadcast reference to sexual and excretory functions.24 9
Placing one's analysis of violence on television within an
indecency framework provides a deceptively alluring fit. Not
only do some of the cases that address indecency and offensiveness involve electronic media, including broadcasting,2 50 but
many of the proposed restrictions on violence have similar
objectives as those that seek to restrict indecency. 4 Additionally, many of the means offered to limit violence in broadcasting are identical to those used to regulate indecent
speech. 5 Upon closer analysis, however, these surface simistriction when broadcast over radio or television).
2 See Winters v New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) (rejecting a New York
statute that defined indecent or obscene as including materials "so massed as to
become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes"); see supra notes 142-86.
249 See supra notes 7-9, 11 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (telephone
messages); FCC v Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radio); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (drive-in movies).
24 The proponents of restricting violence on television argue that televised violence contributes to high societal levels of violence by leading children to imitate
the violence they see and by destroying the moral fabric of the nation. See generally, This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1993) (Professor Charles Ogletree stated "I think it adds up because we see those [violent]
images and we try to emulate them in some way."); Simon, supra note 8, at *3
(stating that television violence "is one of the causes of crime and other anti-social
behavior"); Hundt Challenges Industry to do Much More to Curb Televised Violence,
COMM. DAILY, Jan. 25, 1994, at 1 (FCC Chairman Hundt claiming that violence on
television "inflames young minds").
Similarly, the traditional reasons for sustaining laws that deal with indecency,
offensiveness and obscenity have centered on the perceived damage that such
speech inflicts on the moral and social climate and, in particular, on the development of children. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (well-being
of minors justify regulation of otherwise protected expression by controlling distribution of sexually explicit materials).
25 See, e.g., ACT I, 825 F.2d 1338 (1988) (restrictions on the broadcast of indecent material when children are likely to be watching); S. 1383, supra note 7 (proposal to ban violent programming during hours when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience).
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larities between regulations of sex and violence cannot be sustained. Instead, it becomes clear that violent acts depicted on
television cannot simply be considered another category of
speech deserving a lower level of first amendment protection.
In effect, those who advocate restricting violence on television attempt to expand traditional notions of indecency and
offensiveness to include violence. The mere similarity between
the rationales behind the regulations does not inexorably lead
to the conclusion that the governmental regulation of violence
and sex-two very different aspects of human behavior-are
both constitutional. This is particularly true when violence is
significantly harder to define and delimit than is sex.
1. Catching the Road Runner: Trying to Define and
Identify Prescribable Violence
Examining violence within the context of indecency, offensiveness and obscenity case law illustrates the difficulty of
considering violence as an extension of indecent or offensive
speech. The uncertainty surrounding definitions of violence
raises serious concerns of overbreadth and vagueness. The proposed restrictions on violence encounter vagueness and overbreadth problems similar to those encountered with the ordi2 56 and the statute in Winnance in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,
ters v. New York. 7 The definition of violent acts, whether
defined by currently proposed legislation, by an adaptation of
the FCC's definition for sexual indecency, or through a modified Miller analysis, do not rectify the constitutional barriers to
regulations of violence on television.
In 1993, ten bills seeking to restrict television violence
were presented to Congress. In her testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee," 8 Attorney General Janet Reno stated that three of the bills would
pass constitutional muster. Of these three bills, only one con-

256

422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ordinance barring on-screen nudity at drive-in theaters).

217 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute barring dissemination of "violent" material to

minors).
...See S. 1383, supra note 7; S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring

FCC to evaluate and report on the violence contained in television programs); S.
943, supra note 14; see also T.V. Violence: Hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, supra note 11.
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tains a definition of violence, 259 whereas the two other bills
delegate definitional tasks to the FCC. The bill that includes a
definition of violence, like a fourth proposed bill not addressed
by the Attorney General, 26 ° broadly defines violence to include any act or threatened harm to another person or one's
self.261' The bill defines violence as "any action that has as an

element the use or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or against one's self, with intent to cause
bodily harm to such person or one's self."2 62 This definition is

both unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
A statute or law is overbroad if, in addition to regulating
speech that may constitutionally be restricted, it seeks to regulate constitutionally protected speech, thereby chilling free
expression." In Erznoznik, for example, the Court found
that Jacksonville's blanket ban on the display of nudity at
drive-in movie theaters not only barred restrictable speech,
such as indecency and obscenity, but also barred scenes of
permissible nudity, 21 such as a baby's buttocks. An expansive definition of violence carries dangers of overbreadth similar to those dangers noted in Erznoznik. By including virtually
all physical force exerted against oneself or another, the proposed statute encompasses a breathtaking array of protected
expression. Such a definition would include scenes not only
from violent mobster movies such as GoodFelas,25 but also
2. S. 943, supra note 14 ("For purposes of this Act, an action may involve vio-

lence regardless of whether or not such action or threat of action occurs in a real-

istic or serious context or in a humorous or cartoon type context."). It should be
noted that this bill instructs the FCC to require warning labels on shows that
contain violence. Id.; see infra notes 322-28 and accompanying text. At this juncture, however, the definition employed by this proposed legislation is highlighted
to demonstrate the difficulties in establishing a definition of violence that meets
constitutional strictures, not to analyze the constitutionality of using such a definition for a labeling requirement.
" See H.R. 2837, supra note 7 (directing the FCC to promulgate regulations to
reduce the amount of violence on all television, radio and cable outlets).
261 See supra note 259.
262 See supra note 259.
2" See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-99 (1940); see also supra notes
165-69 and accompanying text.
2" 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
26 GoodFellas (Warner 1990) depicts the story of an Irish-Italian boy who grew
up to become a gangster. The film has been called a "brilliant, unsparing delineation of the sub-culture of crime and the corruption of the spirit it entails."
HALLIWELL'S FILM GUIDE 490 (John Walker ed., 1994).
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2 66 comscenes from virtually all war movies, such as Platoon,
edies, such as A Fish Called Wanda,"' or the slapstick comedy of Charlie Chaplin and most Bugs Bunny cartoons.
A broad definition of violence also implicates the vagueness doctrine. The vagueness doctrine requires that a statute
will be void for vagueness if persons of "common intelligence
[must] guess at [its] meaning."26 8 For instance, in Winters,
the Supreme Court rejected New York's attempt to limit dissemination of material to minors that was likely to stimulate
juvenile delinquency. Similarly, under the proposed definition
of violence, a television producer, network executive or script
writer would be unable to discern which types of violence could
trigger a restriction or regulation. For example, if the
threshold for triggering a regulation is the depiction of an
intentional act designed to inflict bodily harm on another, then
would depictions of violent acts where the mens rea of a particular character is unclear be barred? Indeed, it is difficult to
think of a regulation that is more unclear than one that requires authors and directors to discern and depict the intent of
fictional characters.
Even if the scope of a definition of violence is narrowed to
fit within a modified version of the FCC's definition for sexual
and excretory functions, this does not remedy the constitutional infirmities surrounding restrictions on violence. The FCC's
definition of indecent or offensive speech, affirmed in Pacifica
and ACT I, holds that "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities," may be regulated.2 69 When this standard is applied to
violence, serious questions are raised about the permissibility
and the efficacy of proposed regulations.
Although the Court and the FCC have acknowledged that
the term "indecent" as applied to sexual and excretory functions is inherently vague and, as such, must carefully consider
context, 7 ° sexual and excretory depictions are self-defining

2" PLATOON (Hemdale 1986). Platoon presents the experiences of infantrymen

during the Vietnam War.

FISH CALLED WANDA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1988).
See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 512 (1948).
2- ACT II, 852 F.2d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
270See id.
26? A
268
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and self-limiting. Sexual organs are limited to genitalia and
portions of women's breasts."' Similarly, excretory activity is
limited to defecation and urination. 2 In contrast, simply inserting the term "violence" into the FCC's definition does not
generate similar controls. Unlike sex or excretion, violence has
no inherent limits and is a far more intangible human activity.
With violence one cannot simply point to a portion of anatomy
and proscribe that image from being portrayed. Rather, the
lines between acceptable and unacceptable levels of violence
can vary widely depending on context and imagery. Does one
prohibit five gunshots? Ten gunshots? One pint of blood? What
about violence committed in self-defense or within the context
of a news program? It is difficult to imagine a regulatory
scheme that could be specific and predictable enough to provide broadcasters with adequate notice of what material the
FCC would consider actionable. Unfortunately, neither the
proposed legislation nor the debate surrounding this issue
provide any clarity.
The FCC's definition of sexual indecency is drawn in part
from the Miller test for obscenity.7 The Miller test calls for
the trier of fact to apply contemporary community standards to
determine whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest.2 74 Indecency and obscenity both deal with
sexual activity and therefore carry many of the same indicia
necessary for their identification.2 75 Although the FCC's adoption of a Miller-type test for indecency passed constitutional
scrutiny in Pacifica, the substantive differences between violence and indecency make the use of a Miller-type test to identify prescribable violence problematic. 6 Nonetheless, apply-

27" See, e.g., American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1016 (6th
Cir. 1975) (state statute defines "specified anatomical areas as being: a) human
genitals, pubic region, b) buttock, and c) female breast below a point immediately
above the top of the areola"), rev'd, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
272 See Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98, 100 (1975).
See Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418, 425 (1975) (following Miller, definition for indecency "clarified" by
dropping requirement of "utterly without redeeming social value").
274 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
25 These indicia can include genitalia, women's breasts and various sexual situations. See supra note 271 and accompanying text; see also infra note 279.
27 It should be noted that determinations as to indecent broadcasts are made
by the FCC, not by a jury or judge. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
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ing the Miller test to violence provides a rough framework for
analysis, highlighting the differences between sex and violence,
and demonstrating the extreme difficulty of identifying broadcasts subject to restrictions of violence.
The first part of the Miller test focuses on the appeal to
the "prurient interest in sex." No such corollary exists, however, for violent behavior. Instead, a trier of fact would presumably need to determine whether viewing a film or broadcast
appeals to one's morbid or violent interest2 77 or whether the
work incites persons to commit crimes. This is hard to determine considering that, whereas prurience has a common reference point--"sex" and sexual stimulation-the same is not true
of violence. Violence may evoke a variety of emotional reactions. Some persons may be stimulated by violent images,
others, however, may be disgusted or revolted. Still others,
may discern social commentary or sarcasm from the scenes of
violence.
The second part of the Miller test-whether the work
depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
as specifically defined by state law-also highlights the incompatibility of an obscenity analysis to violent acts."' Unlike
state laws that describe in detail what constitutes "patently
offensive" conduct, no such standards exist to define which
violent acts are patently offensive.27 9 Violence presents a far
more diffuse range of acts than does sexual activity. Although
most persons could probably agree on what is patently offensive, it would be harder to reach a consensus about what is not
patently offensive. There are many different types of violence,
including humorous, sarcastic, sardonic, brutal and playful,
engaged in by a variety of characters, both live-action and car-

' This conclusion is based on the standard elucidated in the stattite struck
down in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Even though the Supreme
Court rejected this formulation on vagueness grounds it is nonetheless useful as a
tool to analyze the "violence on television" debate. This is particularly true considering that the statute in Winters was the first and only time the Supreme Court
analyzed an anti-violence statute that bears any resemblance to violence on television restrictions currently under consideration.
27

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.

See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00 (McKinney 1993) ('obscene" is defined as
any depiction, in a patently offensive manner, of "actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism, masochism, excretion, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals); see also supra note 271 and accompanying text.
'9
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toon. While sex also can be depicted in a variety of ways, the
common definitional characteristics of sex provide a rough
framework to guide legal and factual determinations. Patently
offensive sex can be described with specific reference to organs
and acts, regardless of dramatic context. The same limiting
references, however, cannot be applied to violence. There are
no corollaries to sexual organs or acts that would help the trier
of fact determine whether or not certain violent acts are offensive under the second prong of Miller. Quite simply, there are
too many variations of violence to derive a consistent, predictable and constitutionally sound determination of what is too
violent.
The difficulties of applying the second part of the Miller
test to violence become even more pronounced when one tries
to apply the third part of the test-whether the work taken as
a whole lacks serious, artistic, political or scientific value.2"
Works or images involving violent material can certainly contain many artistic, political or scientific elements that hold
social or entertainment value. However, this part of the Miller
test could exclude valuable films or programs simply because
they contain scenes of violence. After all, if the goal of the antiviolence legislation is to reduce the number of violent images
being shown, and not the overall message of the work, many
popular films and programs would be censored.
Of course, one could adapt Miller, for example, by adopting
a narrow definition of violence which included only the most
heinous and graphic acts. A definition, for instance, that bars
explicit scenes of dismemberment, mutilation and similar acts
might be more defensible. Even with an extremely narrow
definition, however, problems still arise."' First, unlike sex
and excretion there is no body of law and no constitutional
precedent to justify restricting violent scenes of any kind.28 2
2" Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
281

See, e.g., Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 523

(Tenn. 1993) (finding void for vagueness the state's definition of "excess violence"
as "the depiction of acts of violence in such a graphic and/or bloody manner as to
exceed common limits of custom and candor, or in such a manner that it is apparent that the predominant appeal of the material is portrayal of violence for
violence's sake").
22 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1948) (finding state law
that
barred dissemination of "stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime" has no technical or common law meaning and is void for vagueness). As the Winter Court
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Second, a regulation that narrowly defines violence could limit
only an extremely small number of programs and would not
affect the common network programs and scenes that contain
violence. Although certain extremely violent programs might
be kept off the air, other programs that have varying amounts
of violence would not be proscribed because they would not
satisfy all the elements of a Miller-type test. Indeed, the programs that advocates of violence regulations object to-such as
NYPD Blue and films like Terminator II-would be unaffected
by such restrictions.2" Thus, such a system would have the
effect of restricting the first amendment rights of writers, directors, producers and broadcasters while permitting much of
the violence currently on television to remain.
Ultimately, it is not so much the weakness of the Miller
test as the inherent difficulties in its application to regulate
violence on television that lead to its failure to provide a tool to
proscribe violence." Unlike matters regarding more readily
defined sexual behaviors or excretory functions, violence takes
many different forms, some of which may be construed as
harmful to children, but most of which are embedded in stories
that can offer both entertainment and political or social messages.
2. The Seven Dirty Words Versus the Seven Samurai: Is
Violence Lower Value Speech?
Implicit in the arguments to restrict violence on television
is the assumption that violence, as a form of speech, is less
valuable than other forms of non-violent or non-sexual speech.
In FCC v. Pacifica, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a
plurality of the Court consistently suggested that indecent and
noted, obscenity and indecency are limited to sexual acts and there is no precedent to include violence in those descriptions.
213 TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Guild/Carolco 1991); NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast).
28 Interestingly, former FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley understood the problem of proscribing violence and remarked that "the lack of an acceptable objective
standard [for violence] is one of the best reasons why-the Constitution aside-I
feel that self-regulation is to be preferred over the adoption of inflexible governmental rules." Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material,
51 F.C.C.2d 418, 419 n.5 (1975).
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profane speech occupies a lower place in the hierarchy of First
Amendment protection." 5 Put simply, under this view, because such speech is not political in nature and does not constitute material that "[we] would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve" it is less worthy of protection." 6
When applied to violence on television, however, this argument carries all of the definitional overbreadth and vagueness
concerns that can arise with restrictions on indecency, and also
presents additional dangers of restricting the production and
broadcast of "high value" speech. In an effort to cleanse the
airwaves of images that may spark some future, undefined,
amorphous violence by unidentifiable viewers, broadcasters
who present programs that contain violence or carry significant
messages about violence would be dissuaded from presenting
such programs. Out of fear that programs containing violence
could result in increased regulation, fines or channeling restrictions, broadcasters will be dissuaded from presenting programs containing any violence.
A finding that violence is "low value" speech would lead to
a reduction in the amount of "high value" programming. First,
various films and programs may address topics in different
ways. Humor, dialogue, sex and violence may be used to send
messages about various social or political issues. The context
in which violence occurs can be crucial to a story or to creating
a desired effect. Censoring violent scenes could have significant
deleterious effects on the message and value of many programs. There is a risk that a range of news programs, documentaries, dramatic presentations or comedies could be scrutinized and restricted or the producers and writers of such programs will censor themselves in order to comply with federal
regulations.

"8 In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) Justice
Stevens stated "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." Stevens also raised this argument in Pacifica, commenting that "the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and
sexual organs and activities ....
lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978). Justice Souter in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., also noted that "the protection of sexually explicit expression
may be of lesser societal importance than the protection of other forms of expression." 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
...American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70.
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The consequence of such restrictions would be sanitized
versions of important events or issues for which violence is
essential to conveying the severity, seriousness or tragedy of
an event. A brief survey of films and programs that could be
affected by regulation of violence illustrates the dangers that
such regulations pose to the dissemination of valuable and
significant ideas, concepts and events. The film Schindler's
List, for example, presents startling images of ferocious violence during the Holocaust. Under a regulatory regime that
dissuades or prohibits the airing of violent imagery, a network
or independent station may be prohibited or dissuaded from
airing the film or may decide to severely edit the film for television.28 Considering that the overall goal of restricting violence on television is to reduce societal levels of violence, it is
particularly ironic that a film condemning violence could be
edited, restricted or discouraged from being broadcast.
Films made for television that deal with violence in a
socially positive manner would be particularly vulnerable to
restrictions on television violence. Unlike films such as
Schindler's List,288 which make their profits from ticket sales,
made-for-television movies are produced solely for television
and derive revenues from advertising sold during commercial
breaks. If restricti2ons on television violence are adopted, movies made for television will be more timid about addressing
important social and political issues because of concern that
films with violent content will be edited or barred from certain
time slots. With no other revenue source other than television,
those movies with "high value" commentary but with violence
might never be made. For example, the television mini-series
The Day After, 89 which depicts the effects of a full scale nuclear war, could be edited or discouraged from being broadcast
because of its violent content.
Furthermore, films or programs with graphic violence but
with less explicit political or social messages, may nonetheless
contain subtle ideas or concepts which may be curtailed by the
proposed regulations on broadcast violence. For example, in

2" For a discussion of the specific means by which Congress seeks to control

violence see infra notes 296-321 and accompanying text.
288 SCHINDLER'S LIST (Universal Pictures 1993).
2'

The Day After (ABC 1983).
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290 terrorists attempt to take over a Los
the film Die Hard,
Angeles skyscraper. The movie, in addition to being extremely
violent, offers cynical and biting commentary on the role of the
FBI and questions the ethics of the media. Without violent
scenes, Die Hard would not only be less entertaining, but its
cynical message would be muted.
Additionally, films use violence as a tool to generate emotional and psychological reactions among viewers. Here, the
message of the film is not carried by its violence, but by the
juxtaposition of violence with other dramatic tools such as
29 1
humor or sarcasm. For example, in the film Pulp Fiction,
writer and director Quentin Tarantino presents several vignettes involving a boxer and two hitmen. One film critic noted
that the movie "offsets violent events with unexpected laughter ... [creating a] contrast of moods [that] becomes liberating,
calling attention to the real choices the characters make. Far
from amoral or cavalier, these tactics force the viewer to abandon all preconceptions while under the film's spell." 292 Simply
applying a lower-value-of-speech framework to Pulp Fiction
would disregard the catalytic role that violence plays in the
film.
Finally, by adopting a lower-value-of-speech rationale
there is a risk that majoritarian points of view will be perpetuated. Speech perceived as risking the moral fabric of society,
but in fact doing no more than threatening the social status
quo would be suppressed. Pacifica's holding that George
Carlin's monologue was indecent and proscribable illustrates
this principle.2 9 In reaching that conclusion the Court offhandedly noted that "a requirement that indecent language be
avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than
the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language."29 4 This comment illustrates the Court's failure to

DIE HARD (Fox/Gordon ColSilver Pictures 1988).
291PULP FICTION (Miramx 1994).
2

29 Janet Maslin, Pulp Fiction; Quentin Tarantino's Wild Ride on Life's Dangerous Road, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at C1.
I FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
29 Id. at 743 n.18. The Court missed the point of Carlin's monologue. It was
precisely the words themselves and the undue importance society places on them
that Carlin was trying to highlight.
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recognize that Carlin's monologue was designed to dramatically expose the absurdity of common linguistic and social conventions.
In the context of regulations on violence on television, the
dismissive attitude of Pacifica invites the restriction of programs that are anti-majoritarian but contain violence. Thus, if
a writer or a director wishes to raise or propagate unpopular
views about violence or uses violence as an expressive tool to
illustrate a particular subject, Pacifica-type reasoning would
countenance the restriction of that program. Although the
negative effect on some programs' contents could be minor,
restrictions on violence could seriously weaken some show's
political or social message. For example, the movie The Accused295 presents the true story of a woman who had been
gang-raped in a New England bar. The movie contains violent
scenes without which the overall message of the film-the serious social problem of violence against women-would be diminished.
The inability to separate violent acts from the content and
message of a film, demonstrates the inadequacy of the low
value/high value framework as applied to restrictions on broadcast violence. Moreover, this method of analysis highlights the
inapposite nature of sex and violence as forms of human behavior that can be analogized and treated with the same regulatory approach.
C. Congress's T.V. Guide: Specific Regulatory Proposals to
Restrict and Reduce Violence on Television
Although constitutional and methodological problems and
inconsistencies exist in defining and delimiting violence on
television, several different legislative proposals to limit televised violence have been seriously considered by Congress. Not
surprisingly, many of the proposals are merely adaptations of
earlier and ongoing efforts to restrict sexually indecent broadcasts. Moreover, many of the constitutional issues and policy
considerations that make those regulations suspect also make
the regulations that seek to proscribe television violence constitutionally suspect. When the proposed regulations are consid215

THE ACCUSED (UIP/Paramount 1988).
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ered in light of the problems raised in the previous sections,
deeper concerns about the efficacy and the wisdom of regulations of televised violence develop. 6
The FCC's broad goals surrounding the restriction of sexually indecent material are useful when discussing specific proposed regulatory mechanisms. The two most relevant FCC
goals used to construct its regulatory scheme are: 1) ensuring
that parents have an opportunity to supervise their children's
viewership habits, and 2) ensuring the well-being of minors regardless of parental supervision.2 97 By and large, the goal of
aiding parental supervision is reflected in efforts to require
warning labels and "voice-overs" before and during programs,
or to offer computer chips that allow parents to block programs
that have been labeled as violent. The government's second
goal of protecting the social and moral development of minors
is more closely related to efforts to channel violent programs to
hours when children are not watching television. Both goals
may have merit, but neither justifies the methods proposed to
address televised violence.
1. It's Ten P.M.-The Government Is Watching
Your Children
In 1993, members of Congress as well as various public
interest groups proposed a ban, during certain hours, on television broadcasts that contain violence.9 8 Advocates of such a
ban argued that the only way in which a law could ensure that
children will be prevented from viewing material perceived to
be harmful or causing anti-social activity would be to restrict
I In the previous section, both the obscenity and indecency frameworks to
regulations were analyzed and applied to the violence context. This was necessary
to illustrate fully the definitional limitations, constraints and ambiguities that
surround violence. Because the proposed regulations primarily adapt sexual indecency restrictions to violence and do not bar all violent imagery from television,
the need to apply an obscenity analysis is no longer needed. But see Saunders,
supra note 10 (arguing that certain violent expression, like sexual obscenity, is
unprotected by the First Amendment). Instead, discussion will revolve around the
limitations placed on sexually indecent speech as they relate to proposed restrictions on violence.
I A third goal, protecting the rights of adults to be free from indecent materials while in their homes, has not been stressed in the debates surrounding vio-"
lence on television and therefore will not be addressed here.
298 S. 1383, supra note 7, at § 2.
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such programming to those hours when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience. 99 Whether or not this particular legislation is enacted,
it mimics various traditional proposals offered to limit the
airing of sexually indecent material and, therefore, carries
many of the same constitutional and policy infirmities."'
a. Television Fit For Children:The Impossibility of
ConstitutionalityApplying ChannelingRestrictions
Restrictions on television violence, like other restrictions
on speech, must fit within established constitutional law
boundaries. Pacifica,Sable and ACT I, I and III highlight the
constitutional latitude and constraints placed on any legislation designed to channel the broadcasting of violent imagery.
Although Pacifica provides support for broadcast restrictions
based on the time periods when children are likely to be viewing, 0 1 Pacifica's holding is limited by cases such as Butler,
Sable, and ACT I, II, and III, which require such content-based
restrictions on protected speech be narrowly tailored to assure
adult access to protected material.0 2 Therefore, to avoid the
legal entanglements that have ensnared the FCC in its efforts
to restrict indecent broadcasts, Congress or the FCC must
fashion rules that assure adult access to promotional materials, carefully derive its conclusions as to who "children" are, at
what times those children are likely to comprise a substantial
portion of the audience, and the precise hours during which
violence will be barred from being broadcast.3 ' A mere assertion by Congress or the FCC that children of a particular age
range are most likely to constitute a substantial portion of the
audience during certain hours will not pass constitutional

'

S. 1383, supra note 7, at §§ 2, 3(b); see also supra notes 5-7 and accompany-

ing text.
"' See, e.g., Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704 (1993).
301 ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
" Id. at 1341-42; see also Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989) (striking down 24-hour ban on indecent phone messages).

3- ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341. In this case, the FCC had determined that indecent broadcasts could only be aired between the hours of 12:00 AM. and 6:00 A.M.
Id. at 1334.
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muster.!0 4
Based on past FCC regulations and the definition of children contained in the proposed legislation, the threshold age
between childhood and adulthood would be either seventeen or
eighteen years old.0 5 Although this definition of childhood
may comport with past Supreme Court precedent,0 6 it does
not recognize the complexities of restrictions on broadcast violence. Specifically, a definition of children that includes a class
of people who legally can gain access to violent imagery defeats, or runs counter to, the government's purported goal of
protecting all children from such imagery. After all, seventeenand eighteen-year-olds can enter movies rated NC-17, are able
to drive to a video store and rent films, and typically may stay
up late to view violent programs even during non-regulated
hours. Consequently, the efficacy of such an age delineation is
suspect.
More importantly, such an age delineation and time proscription would unduly limit adults' access to protected speech.
If the goal is to prevent children within the prescribed age
group (up to eighteen years old) from watching violent programs, the government would be forced to adopt an extremely
wide time period during which programming will be restricted.
If violent programming could only be shown, for example, between midnight and 6:00 A.M. to protect teenagers from viewing violent imagery, then a large number of adults also would
be precluded from viewing constitutionally protected material.
Adults who work a typical 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. shift most likely are

asleep or preparing for sleep by midnight and, therefore, would
not be able to watch heretofore unrestricted programming. In
fact, it is likely that persons awake during these hours are the
teenagers the government is trying to protect.3 7
If Congress wishes to protect children under twelve years
o4 See id. at 1342-43.
"o See H.R. 2837, supra note 7 ("child" is any individual under 18); Enforcement of Prohibitions against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R.
704 (1993) (defining children as persons under the age of 17).
" See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (conviction upheld for selling
obscene material to a 16-year old).
" This conclusion comports with the FCC's finding that only a twenty-four
hour ban on indecent broadcasts would be effective in preventing minors from
viewing proscribed material. See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
Broadcast Indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990).
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of age, the broadcast window for violent programming would
be wider than if Congress sought to restrict access to adolescents under eighteen. This conclusion is based on the fact that
younger children go to sleep earlier than older children. Even
if the critical age range was dropped to twelve or thirteen, and
the time during which violent programs were prohibited subject to further expansion, problems regarding effectiveness and
adults' access to protected material still would arise.08 For
example, adults with non-traditional work hours would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to view protected material. Additionally, the few hours of prime-time viewing not covered by restrictions could become dumping grounds for programs that
contain violence, thereby creating a "violence zone" in the programming schedule.
The definition of violence also affects the scope of channeling regulations. For instance, a broad definition of violence will
include a wider range of material in the regulatory web so that
the hours of permitted broadcast will become narrower. Thus,
if the government employs a definition for violence similar to
those definitions contained within pending legislation, then
many cartoons such as Bugs Bunny and The Road Runner,
that are traditionally broadcasted on Saturday mornings or
during the late afternoon on weekdays, could be deemed too
violent to be shown outside the window allowed for "violent"
programming. If a 12 P.M. to 6 A.M. restriction is employed,
this leads to the odd result that Bugs Bunny, typically considered children's programming, would only be aired late at night
and in the very early hours of the morning.
Of course, preventing the airing of Bugs Bunny and other
programs that contain the proscribed amount and type of violence during hours when few children are watching is one goal
of channeling regulations. The result, however, is that few
adults will be able to watch material that heretofore has been
protected. While the social and political importance of Bugs
Bunny may be limited,"0 9 the show is only one of hundreds of

" This conclusion regarding probable times when violent programming could be
shown is based on the FCC's 1975 report and the actions taken by ABC, CBS and
NBC to institute the Family Viewing period. See Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
"' This "limited" first amendment view of cartoons is not entirely warranted.
Many of the Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck and Wile E. Coyote cartoons are not only
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programs protected under the First Amendment that could be
proscribed or restricted to certain hours. Such consequences
demonstrate both the danger to constitutional freedoms and
the absurdity of the proposed regulations.
b.

Zoning and Channeling:The Inapplicabilityof
the Secondary Effects Approach to Channeling
Restrictions on Violence

Supporters of channeling restrictions on both sexual indecency and violence have argued that such restrictions are content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions3 1 ° and therefore subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny. One way of
establishing this content-neutrality and the constitutionality of
channeling restrictions would be to assert a secondary-effects
argument.3 1 ' If the government could demonstrate that it
seeks only to reduce the secondary effects of violent programming, such as societal crime, then it might be able to argue that channeling is a legitimate time, place and manner
restriction.
At first glance, the secondary effects reduced by the zoning
ordinances in American Mini Theatres and Renton bear striking similarity to the purported effects of television violence.3 12

examples of animation as a "significant art form" but also carry important literary
and linguistic characteristics. John Canemaker, Ovid, Meet Wile E. Coyote, N.Y.
TnIES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 7, at 38-39 (reviewing HUGH KENNER, CHUCK JONES: A
FLURRY OF DRAWINGS (1994)).
310 See Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698-99 (1987) (channeling sexually indecent
programming is content-neutral); Michael D. Rips, Children's TV Bill Doesn't Violate Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1993, at A26 (arguing that restrictions on
televised violence are content-neutral). But cf. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 n,18
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting FCC's contention that channeling of sexually indecent
speech is a valid time, place and manner restriction).
311 For a discussion of the standard of review that applies to content-neutral
regulations see generally, Stone, supra note 30.
31 The plurality in American Mini Theatres rested its reasoning on both the
lower value of sexually expressive speech and the fact that the regulations promulgated by the city were content-neutral and wholly within the city's compelling
interest of preventing the spread of secondary effects that such theaters allegedly
breed. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). In Renton, the Court rested its decision on the
lower value of speech thesis, but the majority was far more explicit in its conclusion that such regulations are a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction
that serves to prevent harmful secondary effects. The Court noted that Renton's
ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films being shown in the theaters,
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Like the municipalities in American Mini Theatres and Renton,
the advocates of regulating televised violence seek to reduce
crime and violence by restricting the dissemination and availability of audio-visual works. 1 ' Similarities of goals, however, mask serious differences between the two situations and
ultimately undermine the application of secondary effects principles to violence on television restrictions.
The Court has maintained that content-neutral distinctions are permissible provided that the regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."314 In both Renton and American Mini Theatres, the
Court found that the regulations on adult theaters were not
focused on the sexually explicit content of the material being
shown within the theaters but on the negative social harm
such as crime that accompanied the theaters. 15 In a later
case about the constitutionality of restrictions on the display of
signs critical to foreign governments, Justice O'Connor characterized Renton by stating: "as long as the justifications for
regulation have nothing to do with content, i.e., the desire to
suppress crime has nothing to with the actual films being
shown inside adult movie theaters,... the regulation [is] properly analyzed as content neutral. . . . [R]egulations that focus
on the direct impact of speech on its audience ... are not the

type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton."16 Thus,
if the municipalities in Renton and American Mini Theatres
had sought to regulate adult theaters because of their deleterious effects on moral climate, sexual attitudes and gender roles,
then the zoning regulations in those cases would have constituted content-based restrictions deserving of strict scrutiny.
In the case of broadcast violence, however, the government
seeks restrictions precisely because of the violence that such
images allegedly cause. Any regulation that purports to restrict
violence on television as a means to reduce the secondary effect
of violence in society, must be based upon the content of televi-

but at the secondary effects such theaters produced. 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
' See supra notes, 5-7, 145, 218 and accompanying text.
"' Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
:35 See id. at 49; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 61.
:36 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988). This particular reading of the
holding in Renton was joined only by Justices Stevens and Scalia.
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sion broadcasts. The program would be regulated because of its
violence and the viewers' reaction to that violence-forming
the basis for the argument that violence on television must be
controlled in order to prevent violence in real life."i ' Consequently, channeling violence on television, unlike zoning restrictions, constitutes a content-based restriction.
Furthermore, the nature of the limitation placed on broadcasters and on the viewing public is far more severe in a
scheme that regulates violent television images than in one
aimed at theater owners or the patrons of adult theaters. Instead of merely limiting the particular geographical location of
a theater, thereby inconveniencing a patron, any restriction on
the broadcasting of violent imagery, prevents a large segment
of the population from viewing constitutionally protected material. If a regulation is instituted to restrict violent programming to times when children are not likely to be in the audience, then those persons who work at night, go to sleep early
or prefer to watch television during the day would be unable to
watch protected material.318 This stands in contrast to patrons of adult theaters who merely have to travel somewhat
further within the same town to find an adult theater.
Finally, the nexus between the location of the adult theaters in Renton and American Mini Theatres and the negative
secondary effects was far more certain than that between televised violence and societal violence. Proponents of the adult
theater ordinances pointed to specific increases in crime and
"neighborhood blight" brought upon by the presence of such
theaters.319 A link between the presence of adult theaters and
a concurrent rise in crime and other secondary effects is far
easier to determine than a more diffuse society-wide rise in
violent behavior linked to televised violence. Indeed, to argue
that a secondary effect can be broad-based and indefinite opens

317 See supra note 8.
318 The particular hours that this type of ban would encompass is currently

under debate. In ACT III, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia struck
down the FCC's 6:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. ban on indecent programming. The court
found that the ban was not narrowly tailored and that the government failed to
find an appropriate definition for children. The court also concluded that the FCC
did not adequately investigate how many children watched television at various
times of the day. 11 F.3d 170, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
19 Renton, 475 U.S. at 51; American Mini, 427 U.S. at 54-55.
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up an enormous area of potentially prescribable behavior.
Under such a framework, any regulation that purports to deal
with a secondary effect and that is content-neutral in character
could be subject to control. 2 °
In contrast, the indecency regulations at issue in Pacifica
concerned fairly insulated and easily identifiable words and
images. Restrictions on violence, however, do not involve clearcut and discrete language. Instead, such regulations are broader and greatly diminish the amount of material and the number of ideas on television. The true nature of the danger posed
by regulating televised violence, however, is apparent when
one examines Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Boos v.
Barry. Justice Brennan completely rejected the secondary effects rationale and stated: "I can only hope that, when the
Court is actually presented with a case involving a contentbased regulation of political speech that allegedly aims at socalled secondary effects of that speech, the court will recognize
and avoid the pitfalls of the Renton approach." 2' Similarly,
the Court must recognize that restricting programs containing
violence poses the substantial risk of restricting the political
and social discourse they contain.
Restrictions based on channeling principles, therefore, are
problematic because they unduly limit adult access to protected material while largely failing to restrict violent imagery
from minors. Such restrictions also cannot be justified by simply applying a secondary-effects framework. Ultimately, these
restrictions are both ineffectual and pose such a threat to the
First Amendment that they invite strong criticism and harsh

" Of course, it could be argued that theatres, the medium in issue in Renton
and American Mini Theatres, receives more first amendment protection than television. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). The
nature of the requirements and restrictions upheld in Red Lion and Pacifica, however, are fundamentally different and narrower than many of the proposed restrictions on television violence.
Red Lion, for example, dealt with the obligation of broadcasters to air opposing opinions on issues of national concern and therefore expanded the amount of
information broadcasted. The violence restrictions, however, would seriously contract the amount of information disseminated on television. Not only would time
limitations on broadcasting violent material restrict information dissemination, but
the definitional uncertainties inherent with violence restrictions and the inability
to separate context and content from violence would severely limit the discussion
and presentation of important ideas and issues.
.21Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 338 (1988).
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judicial scrutiny.

2. Father Knows Best: Monitoring, Labeling
Electronically Tagging Violent Broadcasts

and

The FCC's and Congress's approach to limiting sexual and
violent imagery on television is partially motivated by an interest in helping parents monitor and control their children's
television diet. This concern is apparent in the numerous proposals that seek to monitor and label violent television programs to alert parents to program's content. 2 Proposals being considered by Congress include: warning labels before and
during a program, advisories within television guides, monitoring committees that rate the amount of violence on different
stations, and computer circuitry to allow parents to block out
violent programs." These efforts reflect an interest in protecting children by aiding parents in their supervisory role.
The proposed legislation is less intrusive than channeling
or banning violence and, generally does not carry the same
first amendment concerns." On the surface, these regulatory
efforts simply provide the viewer or parent with the notice
necessary to avoid programs that they may find objectionable.
Further analysis, however, reveals the problems and questions
that arise with monitoring, labeling and electronic tagging. Although these proposals do not directly threaten free speech in
the same way as channeling restrictions, they do risk chilling
free expression and undermining first amendment principles.
As with more severe regulations, such as channeling, the
definition one chooses for violence has a profound impact on
the constitutionality and effectiveness of restrictions on violence. The symbiosis between the scope of the definition of
violence and the constitutionality of regulations persists in the
labeling and monitoring context: a broad definition raises overbreadth and vagueness concerns, whereas a narrow definition
could limit the effectiveness of the regulation. A regulation
that requires labeling of shows with violence must overcome
" See, e.g., S. 943, supra note 14 (proposing video and audio warning for all
broadcasting that may contain violence).
" S. 943, supra note 14; see also supra note 8.
324 For a concise constitutional analysis of labeling requirements, see generally
Kim, supra note 10.
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overbreadth and vagueness concerns similar to those that exist
with channeling restrictions. The regulations must be narrow
and clear enough to require labeling of only that material covered by the regulations so as to provide broadcasters with
notice of which shows will be affected.
The very nature of the labeling and monitoring regulations
imposed on broadcasters is different from that of channeling
restrictions. Under labeling and monitoring regulations broadcasters are simply required to superimpose labels and warnings rather than being restricted from showing violent films
and programs during certain times of the day as is the case
with channelling. Thus, with monitoring restrictions the shows
are still broadcast but a duty is imposed on the broadcaster to
include these labels and warnings." 5
In practice, however, this duty is a subtle yet effective
censorship technique. Unlike a regulation that explicitly bars
or channels violence to discrete hours, labeling and monitoring
requirements rely on forces other than government-such as
pressure from the public or advertisers-to restrict speech. As
a result, television stations and networks may practice selfcensorship in an effort to avoid either being publicly exposed
as a "high violence station" or having their programs labeled
as violent, and therefore less able to attract advertising."'
Rather than producing a combination of meritorious shows and

" A high technology variant of warning 'labels is the "V-chip" proposal. H.R.
2888, supra note 7. This proposal would require manufacturers of televisions to
include electronic circuitry that would allow parents to black out programs that
carry an invisible signal, inserted by the broadcaster into the transmission, that
indicates programs that contain violence. Id. Specifically, broadcasters would transmit the signal inside the "vertical blanking interval," the black band that separates each frame of video. See Edmund L. Andrews, Cable Industry Endorses Ratings and Devices to Lock Out Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at Al. Although
in theory this proposal appears non-restrictive and relatively benign, it has significant limitations. First, it is unclear what standards will be utilized to determine
which programs would carry the hidden signal. The legislation also does not include a definition of violence or guidelines for broadcasters as to which shows the
signal should be attached. It is not hard to imagine overzealous network officials
tagging large numbers of programs simply to avoid public chastisement by the
FCC or Congress.
26 See Kim, supra note 10, at 1397 n.56 (1994) (highlighting controversy surrounding NYPD Blue and ABC's difficulty in securing advertisers for the show,
and noting that "[b]ecause advertisers generally avoid associating with programming that is offensive or controversial . . . the violence label could become a stigma that effectively repels sponsors").
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non-meritorious shows with violence, networks and production
companies may simply reject shows with violence, regardless of
their social messages or political value. Thus, shows that need
violence to realistically portray issues or events either will not
be made or will be deprived of their power to effectively communicate ideas and information.
Moreover, unlike the labeling of sexually indecent programs or programs with offensive language that carry relatively few warnings, labeling of programs with violence could
cover, depending upon the nature of the definition of violence,
vast numbers of programs. Thus, programs and shows as diverse as Jurassic Park,27 Matlock3 28 and The Road Runner
could carry warning labels. Labeling such varied and different
shows would dilute the purpose and effect of labeling regulations. Instead of being alerted to and avoiding programs with
violence, viewers could become desensitized to the labels and
simply ignore them. Alternatively, if violence labels are required for only the most violent shows, then those labels could
become advertisements, drawing viewers interested in seeing
violence on television.
Another problem with this form of regulation is that it
assumes that most parents have the desire and ability to regulate their children's viewing of violent programming. With
increasingly complex family structures, parents who are not
home to monitor their children, and the increased ability of
children to access programming in many different ways, it is
extremely difficult to protect children from images and programs thought to cause them harm. A further complication is
that, unlike a warning on a record label, warnings on broadcasts are easily missed by persons who change channels or
tune-in after the start of a program. Consequently, the purpose
behind the warning, notice to the viewer, is seriously mitigated.
CONCLUSION

Unlike other categories of unprotected speech, violence is
not subject to a clear definition. This definitional uncertainty

32 JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).
32

Matlock (NBC).

19941

REGULATING VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION

1173

militates against the proposition that violence can simply be
added to the list of unprotected categories of speech. Violence
carries many different meanings and implications. While much
of what is shown on television does not contain political or
social messages, the inability to separate out "good" violence
from "bad" violence makes any form of regulation constitutionally suspect.
The definitional infirmities surrounding violence highlight
the unconstitutional and inadequate nature of proposed legislation. Channeling programs that contain violence by forcing
them into late-night or pre-dawn time periods risks depriving
significant portions of adult audiences of viewing material and
allowing only programs fit for children. In addition, this regulatory system would discourage networks from broadcasting or
producing programs that contain violence but are nonetheless
salutary. Warning labels and monitoring committees create
similar risks of censorship.
Admittedly, this analysis leads to the seemingly odd and
counter-intuitive conclusion that sex and not violence can be
restricted from television. After all, it would appear that of the
two forms of human behavior sex is more socially constructive
than violence. This observation, however, masks the complexities inherent in the sex and violence debate. First, arguing
that only sex should be restricted, not violence, does not necessarily mean that existing restrictions on airing sexual material
are rational, well-thought out or socially desirable. Second,
restrictions on sex on television carry their own definitional
uncertainties and such flawed regulations should not justify
incorporating violence into a similar scheme simply because of
the perception that sex is a more valuable form of expression
than violence. Extending these restrictions to violence would
merely compound the problems surrounding restrictions on
sex.
The violence on television debate illustrates the need for
the First Amendment to act as a check on government overreaching. Congress and other policymakers have turned their
investigatory and regulatory powers towards broadcasters in
an effort to stem rising levels of violence. The First Amendment is more than simply a mantra to be recited whenever the
government attempts to regulate or restrict speech. It is a
principle of governance that encourages the free flow of ideas
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and discourages the automatic restriction of speech in order to
solve or prevent social problems.
The failure of legislators to fully address and employ other
means to reduce societal levels of violence generally-not just
televised violence-highlights the disingenuousness of televised
violence restrictions. The violence on television debate derogates first amendment principles as well as general concepts of
governance. Instead of asking why programs with violence
attract large audiences, Congress has proposed poorly drafted
and vague legislation that unduly restricts speech. Rather than
addressing the root problems of violence, Congress is content to
place warning labels on an enormously broad range of programming. By pointing an accusatory finger at broadcasters,
Congress diverts attention from the more substantive, and
politically less palatable, techniques for reducing violence.
Such a simplistic approach of restricting television programs
does not adequately cure the underlying causes and perpetuators of violence.
Benjamin P. Deutsch 2

" The author wishes to thank Professor Gerald Gunther for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Note.

